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Abstract
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) have emerged as a new information-gathering
paradigm based on the collaborative efforts of a large number of self-organized
sensing nodes. These networks form the basis for many types of smart envi-
ronments such as smart hospitals, intelligent battlefields, earthquake response
systems, and learning environments. A set of applications, such as biomedicine,
hazardous environment exploration, environmental monitoring, military track-
ing and reconnaissance surveillance, are the key motivations for the recent re-
search efforts in this area. Different from traditional networks, sensor networks
do impose a set of new limitations for the protocols designed for this type of
networks. Devices in sensor networks have a much smaller memory, constrained
energy supply, less process and communication bandwidth. Topologies of the
sensor networks are constantly changing due to a high node failure rate, occa-
sional shutdown and abrupt communication interferences. Because of the nature
of the applications supported, sensor networks need to be densely deployed and
have anywhere from hundred to thousands of sensing devices, which are orders of
magnitude larger than traditional ad hoc mobile networks. In addition, energy
conservation becomes the center of focus because of the limited battery capacity
and the difficulty of recharge in the hostile environment. With fundamental dif-
ference between traditional networks and sensor networks, it is not appropriate
and probably inefficient to port previous solutions for ad hoc networks into sensor
networks with only incremental modifications. For ensuring the functionality of
a sensor network, especially in malicious environments, security mechanisms are
essential for all sensor networks. However, sensor networks differ from classical
(wireless) networks and this consequently makes it harder to secure them. Rea-
sons for this are resource constraints of the sensor nodes, the wireless multi-hop
communication, and the possibility of node compromise. Since sensor nodes are
often deployed in unattended or even hostile environments and are usually not
equipped with tamper-resistant hardware, it is relatively easy to compromise a
sensor node. By compromising a sensor node, an adversary gets access to all data
stored on the node, such as cryptographic keys. This thesis discusses concepts and
mechanisms to cope with energy efficiency and security issues in wireless sensor
networks. The contribution of this work is to provide a novel system architecture
for WSN which offers interfaces for diverse applications to directly control com-
munication, topology, mobility, security, localization, and energy-saving based
on predefined requirements. Each of these features are interleaved with each
other, e.g. changing topology parameters would directly influence energy-saving.
Communication manages the local access to the medium by neighboring sensor
nodes in an efficient way. In this thesis, we analyze different MAC protocols and
iv
develop a dynamic approach combining contention based and time slot based
communication schemes. We investigate several network topologies and provide
a flexible way to build hierarchical structures in energy efficient way. The variable
range protocol adjusts communication range of each sensor node to a minimum
without loosing overall network connectivity. The mobility feature allows appli-
cations to update or reprogram sensor nodes in a convenient way. This thesis
provides a tiny mobile agent system to change or modify applications. The main
focus of the thesis lies on securing data and communication in WSN. We intro-
duce a architecture that offers security features in multiple communication levels.
The security goes hand in hand with energy saving to compensate the increased
performance need of encryption in communication. This thesis investigates also
localization issues in WSN. We develop a location estimation and tracking sys-
tem using wireless sensors. All these features combined in one middleware form a
novel energy-efficient and secure system architecture for wireless sensor networks.
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1 Introduction
After the invention of the transistor in the mid 50’s mainframes were only acces-
sible to research institutions. The progressive miniaturization and the decline in
prices for computer components leveraged personal computers to their triumph.
Meanwhile, the trend goes away from wired desktop to much smaller, but still
powerful computer systems such as smart-phones, laptops, or net-books. This
development also led to a useful and interesting area: the sensor networks.
Sensors are a quite old technology. Galileo Galilei wrote in his letters to a friend
about a device to measure heat in the 17th century. It was probably the first
thermometer. Electronic sensors arose from the technological development. To-
days, sensors are used nearly in every manufacture to monitor and control the
production. It is unimaginable to build cars, airplanes, and all kinds of machines
without sensors. Technological progress allows more and more sensors to be
manufactured on a microscopic scale as micro-sensors using MEMS technology.
Sensor networks consist of many small, inexpensive but highly energy-efficient
microcomputers with the purpose of sensing and monitoring a certain environ-
ment. Depending on the application, the monitored environment can be covered
by hundreds or even thousands of sensor nodes. Sensor nodes consist of a sens-
ing, a processing, a transceiver, and a power unit. The sensing unit is used
to perform some measurements of some physical phenomena, e.g., temperature,
pressure, movements. The processing unit consists of a slow CPU and a restricted
memory space. It enables a sensor node to pre-process the measured data before
sending it using the transceiver unit. The measurements are sent to a central base
station called sink. The power unit usually consists of a battery pack. In addi-
tion, a sensor node may be equipped with some additional application-dependent
components such as location finding system, actuators etc.
Most WSN applications scenarios, especially large-scale WSNs with thousands of
sensor nodes, require that an individual sensor node has to be cheap. As a result,
the available resources are extremely constrained. The constrained computational
power of a sensor node requires the use of only efficient operations which are
suitable for the limited CPU and the restricted memory space. Especially the
limited energy resources make energy saving of paramount importance to achieve
a long lifetime of a WSN. Thus, the overhead for computation and communication
must be low. Since communication requires a significant amount of energy, only
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as few messages as necessary which are as short as possible should be transmitted.
Since the range of the wireless transceiver is also limited, messages are sent in a
multi-hop communication, i.e., sensor nodes forward messages hop by hop to the
destination.
A distributed system architecture for WSNs should offer applications the pos-
sibility to interface different parameters in order to influence communication,
energy-efficiency, and security of the network. Figure 1.1 illustrates a possible
system architecture for wireless sensor networks.
Application
Communication Topology Mobility Security Energy-saving
Middleware
Sensor OS
Hardware
Sensor OS
Hardware
...
Localization
Figure 1.1: Distributed System Architecture for Wireless Sensor Networks
On top of the architecture the application level is located. Based on application
requirements the system architecture can focus on different features, i.e. commu-
nication, topology, mobility, security, localization, and energy-saving. Features
are interconnected with each other, e.g. changing parameters in topology would
directly influence energy-saving.
• Communication aims the local access of the medium by neighboring sensor
nodes in an efficient way. In general, there are contention based and time
based communication schemes. Both schemes have their own advantages
and disadvantages. In this thesis, we propose a mixed usage of contention
and time based communication.
• A network can be build using different topologies. Small adjustments in the
topology of a network can effect highly energy consumption and security. A
system architecture should offer applications to dynamically adapt topology
to changes in network structure.
• The mobility feature offers users to easily update or reprogram sensor nodes
in the network. Code mobility is a convenient approach to change or modify
applications.
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• In most sensor projects, security is disregarded because of complexity and
performance reasons. Nevertheless, the system architecture should provide
possibilities to secure data and communication in applications.
• Location of a node is probably the most important context in wireless sensor
applications. Especially, determining the exact position of a node indoors
is very complicated. Therefore, the system architecture should provide
functionalities for location estimation and tracking of sensor nodes. In all
features, energy-saving is an important optimization goal.
The main focus of this thesis is to elaborate energy efficient and secure communi-
cation in a parallel way. A middleware abstracts from diverse sensor nodes that
are distributed in the environment. A sensor operating system, in some cases
also named firmware, is used to access node hardware components, like micro-
processor, memory, sensors, and transceivers. The middleware offers applications
interfaces to modify parameters on nodes for local communication, topology, mo-
bility, localization, security, and energy saving.
1.1 Outline
This thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we present necessary background
information of wireless sensor networks including WSNs characteristics, architec-
ture, communication systems, topologies, classifications, and applications. Chap-
ter 3 gives an overview about related projects in the areas of energy efficient
communication, code mobility, location estimation and tracking, and security in
WSN. The following chapters describe features of the proposed system archi-
tecture and present evaluation results for developed approaches. Chapter 4 in-
troduces an energy efficient protocol for local communication in WSN. Topology
aspects are discussed in chapter 5 and a novel protocol is described to dynamically
adapt connections in the network with the aim to optimize energy consumption.
Chapter 6 elaborates code mobility issues in WSN and introduces a mobile agent
system for sensor networks. A novel security architecture for WSN is the focus
of chapter 7. In chapter 8 location estimation and tracking in WSN is discussed
and an indoor location tracking system is introduced. The thesis finishes with
the conclusion.

2 Wireless Sensor Networks
The convergence of the Internet, communications, and information technologies,
coupled with recent engineering advances, is paving the way for a new genera-
tion of inexpensive sensors and actuators, capable of achieving a high order of
spatial and temporal resolution and accuracy. The technology for sensing and
control includes sensor arrays, electric and magnetic field sensors, seismic sensors,
radio-wave frequency sensors, electro optic and infrared sensors, laser radars, and
location and navigation sensors.
Advances in the areas of sensor design, materials, and concepts will further de-
crease the size, weight, and cost of sensors and sensor arrays by orders of magni-
tude and will increase their spatial and temporal resolution and accuracy.
The technology for sensing and control now has the potential for significant ad-
vances, not only in science and engineering, but equally important, on a broad
range of applications relating to critical infrastructure protection and security,
health care, the environment, energy, food safety, production processing, quality
of life, and the economy. In addition to reducing costs and increasing efficiencies
for industries and businesses, wireless sensor networking is expected to bring con-
sumers a new generation of conveniences, including, but not limited to, remote
controlled heating and lighting, medical monitoring, automated grocery checkout,
personal health diagnosis, automated automobile checkups, and child care.
In this chapter we will explore many aspects of WSNs environment such as sensor
node technology, overview of wireless ad hoc networking as a base of WSN, de-
scription of several WSNs perspectives (WSNs characteristics, architecture, com-
munication systems, topologies, and classifications), routing protocols in WSNs,
and finally WSNs applications.
2.1 Sensor Node Technology
Recent advances in Micro Electro Mechanical Systems (MEMS), tiny micro-
processors and low power radio technologies have created low-cost, low-power,
multi-functional miniature sensor devices (nodes), which can observe and react
to changes in physical phenomena of their surrounding environments.
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Wireless sensor networks (WSN) combine three basic features in a single system:
sensing, processing, and wireless communication. The idea is not only to measure
a physical quantity, but also to process this real world data locally and to send
gathered information to interested entities. All of these functions are kept in
a single device called sensor node. A sensor node is mainly composed of four
basic components: a power unit, sensing unit, processing unit, and transceiver
(transmit/receive) unit. It also may contain some additional components to serve
some applications like position finding, and an actuator as shown in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: Basic sensor node components
By means of the transceiver circuitry, a sensor unit communicates with nearby
units relying on RF communication. Currently available sensors employ one
of two types of radios. The simplest (and cheaper) alternative offers a basic
Carrier Sense Multiple Access (CSMA) Medium Access Control (MAC) protocol,
operates in a license free band (315/433/868/916 MHz) and has a bandwidth in
the range 20 - 115 kbps. Newer models support an 802.15.4 radio operating in
the 2.4 GHz band and offering a 250 kbps bandwidth. The radio range varies
with a maximum of about 300 meters for the first radio type and 125 meters for
the 802.15.4 radios [BPC+07].
In general, a sensor node is suffering from limited resources as follows [WLSC06]:
• Limited Memory and Storage Space: A sensor node is a tiny device with
only a small amount of memory and storage space, with such a limitation,
the software built for the sensor node must also be quite small.
• Power Limitation: Energy is the biggest constraint to wireless sensor ca-
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pabilities. Once sensor nodes are deployed in an environment, they cannot
be easily replaced (high operating cost) or recharged (high cost of sensors).
Therefore, the battery charge taken with them to the field must be con-
served to extend the life of the individual sensor node and the entire WSN.
• Unreliable Communication: Certainly, unreliable communication is a major
threat to WSN security. The security of the network relies heavily on a well
defined security protocol which in turn depends somewhat on communica-
tion.
2.1.1 Hardware
Sensor hardware can be divided in four groups [HHKK04]. Special-purpose sen-
sor nodes are purposely designed to sacrifice flexibility in order to be as small
and inexpensive as possible. In contrast, generic sensor nodes can be flexibly
adjusted to different application scenarios. They provide a rich expansion inter-
face where various different types of sensors can be attached. Typical examples
are the MICA Motes [HSW+00] [HC02] or the TelosB motes [PSC05]. High-
bandwidth sensor nodes possess processing and communication capabilities to
deal with complex sensor streams, including video and voice processing. An ex-
ample are the Bluetooth equipped BTnodes [BTn07]. Gateway nodes can act
as a sink providing the link between the WSN and backbone infrastructure, i.e.,
the network connection to the task manager node and the user. The Stargate
platform is a typical example for gateway nodes [Cro07].
Hardware platforms for WSNs are developed by many research groups and com-
mercial companies. Since WSNs are currently in a development stage and there
is no true killer application that would decrease the costs, there exists no plat-
form which dominates the market. For many research groups it is often more
convenient and even less expensive to build their own WSN devices instead of
buying commercial ones. However, the above mentioned Berkeley MICA Motes
and their clones are broader used as other platforms and are accepted as the de
facto platform in the research community. Algorithms and protocols proposed
for WSNs usually assume hardware resources comparable to the MICA Motes.
Figure 2.2 shows a MICA2 Mote. The sensor node is equipped with an Atmel
ATmega128L processor which is based on a Harvard RISC architecture. The
maximum clock signal of the CPU is 16 MHz which provides a throughput up
to 16 MIPS. The MICA2 mote provides 128 kbyte Program Flash Memory, 512
kbyte Measurement Flash, and 4 kbyte Configuration EEPROM. The radio is a
TI CC1000 (formerly Chip-Con) with a data rate of 38.4 kbps. The standard
packet size is 36 byte (with a payload of 29 byte). The successor MICAz has
similar properties except that the data rate is increased to 250 kbps and the
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Figure 2.2: Berkeley MICA 2 Mote Figure 2.3: Sun SPOT Mote
and MICAz nodes are powered with two AA batteries. The energy requirements of the
MICA2 motes are stated differently in the literature (see Section 2.3 for details). To save
energy, sensor nodes can use different sleep modes. The MICA motes use the TinyOS
[233] operating system that was developed for resource constrained sensor nodes. It is
written in nesC [94], a programming language for deeply networked systems. Table 2.1
summarizes the properties of the MICA2 sensor node.
Clock Signal up to 16 MHz
Word Length 8 bit
Program Flash Memory 128 kbyte
Measurement Flash 512 kbyte
Configuration EEPROM 4 kbyte
Data Rate 38.4 kbps
Table 2.1: MICA2 Hardware [53] with Atmel ATmega128L processor [52]
Another hardware platform called Sun SPOT [228] is developed by Sun Microsystems.
The sensor nodes are equipped with a 180 MHz 32-bit ARM920T processor with 512
kbyte RAM and 4 Mbyte Flash-memory. The radio is a TI CC2420 and is IEEE 802.15.4
compliant. An USB interface is also present. A Sun SPOT node is powered with a 3.7V,
750 mAh lithium-ion battery that is rechargeable via the USB interface. Sun specifies
the operation time up to 7 hours with both CPU and the radio active. By having the
processor in sleep mode and by turning off the radio the operation time is extended.
Figure 2.3 shows a Sun SPOT node.
In this thesis we do not assume sensor nodes with such computational power although
it might enable more sophisticated protocols. However, the increased energy consump-
Figure 2.2: Berkeley MICA2 Mote
packet size can be up to 128 byte using the ZigBee transceiver CC2420. ZigBee
is a short-range, low-power, low-cost, low-data-rate wireless multihop networking
technology standard. It is built upon the Physical (PHY) and Medium Access
Control (MAC3) layers of the IEEE 802.15.4 standard [IEE06]. ZigBee specifies
network and application layer, as well as the security service provider. MICA2
and MICAz nodes are powered with two AA batteries. The energy requirements
of the MICA2 motes are stated differently in the literature. To save energy, sensor
nodes can use different sleep modes.
Another hardware platform called Sun SPOT [Sun] is developed by Sun Microsys-
tems. The sensor nodes are equipped with a 180 MHz 32-bit ARM920T processor
with 512 kbyte RAM and 4 Mbyte Flash-memory. The radio is a TI CC2420 and
is IEEE 802.15.4 compliant. An USB interface is also present. A Sun SPOT node
is powered with a 3.7V, 750 mAh lithium-Ion battery that is rechargeable via the
USB interface. Sun specifies the operation time up to 7 hours with both CPU
and the radio active. By having the processor in sleep mode and by tur ing off
the radio the operation time is extended. Figure 2.3 shows a Sun SPOT node.
Although these nodes have different characteristics, their basic hardware compo-
nents are the same. Therefore, these hardware components should be organized
in a way that makes them work correctly and effectively without a conflict in sup-
port of the specific applications for which they are designed. Each sensor node
needs an operating system (OS) that can control the hardware, provide hardware
abstraction to application software, and fill in the gap between applications and
the underlying hardware.
Traditional OS functions are therefore to manage processes, memory, CPU time,
file system, and devices. This is often implemented in a modular and layered
fashion, including a lower layer of kernels and a higher layer of system libraries.
Traditional OSs are not suitable for WSN because they have constrained re-
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sources and diverse data-c ntric applications, in addition to a variable topology.
To support the node operation, it is i portant to have open-source operating
systems designed specifically for WSNs. Such operating systems typically utilize
a component-based architecture that enables rapid implementation and innova-
tion while minimizing code size as required by the memory constraints endemic in
sens r networks. Such operating systems should embody the following functions,
bearing in mind the limited resource of sensor nodes:
• Compact and small in size since the sensor nodes have very small memory.
The sensor nodes often have memories of only tens or hundreds of kilobytes.
• Provide real-time support, since there are real-time applications, especially
when actuators are inv lved. The information received may become out-
dated rather quickly. Therefore, information should be collected and re-
ported as quickly as possible.
• Provide efficient resource management mechanisms in order to allocate mi-
croprocessor time and limited memory. The CPU time and limited memory
must be scheduled and allocated for processes carefully to guarantee fairness
(or priority if required).
• Support reliable and efficient code distribution since the functionality per-
formed by the sensor nodes may need to be changed after deployment.
The code distribution must keep WSNs running normally and use as little
wireless bandwidth as possible.
• Support power management, which helps to extend the system lifetime and
improve its performance. For example, the operating system may schedule
the process to sleep when the system is idle, and to wake up with the advent
of an incoming event or an interrupt from the hardware.
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• Provide a generic programming interface up to sensor middleware or appli-
cation software. This may allow access and control of hardware directly, to
optimize system performance.
TinyOS is one such the most famous of a de facto standard, but not the only
one [Uni]. It is written in nesC, a programming language for deeply networked
systems [GLvB+03]. TinyOS’s component library includes network protocols,
distributed services, sensor drivers, and data acquisition tools; these can be used
as-is or be further refined for a specific application. TinyOS’s event-driven exe-
cution model enables fine-grained power management.
2.2 Applications of WSN
Typical applications of WSNs include monitoring, tracking, and controlling.
Some of the specific applications are habitat monitoring, object tracking, nuclear
reactor controlling, fire detection, traffic monitoring, etc. In a typical application,
sensor nodes are scattered in a region where they are meant to collect data and
send it to the sink node. The main applications of WSNs can be categorized as
follow:
• Military applications: In military applications such as battlefield surveil-
lance, target tracking and monitoring, enemy reconnaissance, etc., WSNs
can be deployed over a region where some phenomenon is to be monitored.
As an example, a large quantity of sensor nodes could be deployed over a
battlefield to detect enemy intrusion.
• Environmental monitoring: Many valuable applications can be found in
agriculture where sensor networks could be fitted with a near infinite variety
of chemical and biological sensors. A simple but very useful application is
the control of irrigation. In large farms and ranches that may cover several
square kilometers only portions of the area may get some rain sporadically.
Knowing which areas of the field need irrigation can direct the soil watering
system to precisely irrigate those areas. Such an application is ideal for
wireless sensor networks since data rate over the network is very low and
delay of several minutes or hours could be tolerated.
• Medical applications: With the development of biological sensors, health
monitoring is expected to grow quickly. The development of these sensors
might experience a breakthrough if conventional CMOS integrated circuits
can be combined with biological sensors. Applications in this area can be
the monitoring of the blood sugar and blood pressure, heart pulses and
respiration rate. Some sensors might just be wearable and attached exter-
nally others might be implanted to allow the monitoring of the person. In
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a first stage these sensor networks might find their application area on big
farms where sensors will be attached to the animals. The sensor informa-
tion might be used for location information or for determining the need for
treatments to prevent parasites.
• Engineering applications: WSNs can also be deployed for many applications
such as power plant monitoring, oil pipeline monitoring, fault detection in
bridges or dams, building monitoring, etc.
• Commercial applications: WSNs can be used for environmental control
in industrial and office buildings, inventory control, vehicle tracking and
detection, traffic flow surveillance, etc.
• Industrial automation: Industrial facilities consist of a set of relatively large
physical plants where long cables need to be installed to transfer the state of
the plant to the control room (valves, temperature, pressure, etc.) which is
centralized in most facilities. Significant cost savings can be achieved when
these cables are replaced by inexpensive wireless communication. Because
most of the information being communicated is state information, it only
changes relatively slowly, therefore in normal operation traffic is very low
but when it is required to send new state information, the network must
be very reliable. Exactly this could be guaranteed by a wireless sensor net-
work where every node has many neighbors so that many different routing
paths would exist from source to destination. A further example is the use
of wireless sensor networks on moving or rotating machinery where wired
sensors are simply impractical.
• Home applications: include home automation, instrumented environment,
and automated meter reading.
As this wide variety of different applications shows, WSNs may have totally differ-
ent properties and characteristics. WSNs may vary from small networks to large
networks consisting of hundreds or thousands of sensor nodes. The used sensor
node hardware may vary from tiny, battery-powered and extremely resource con-
strained sensor nodes to powerful sensor nodes with permanent energy supply
that are able to perform extensive computations. Just as well, the WSN can
consist of different types of sensor nodes where the more powerful sensor nodes
are able to perform special tasks. These are only a few examples of different
characteristics and properties of WSNs.
This wide area of application scenarios induces also different security require-
ments for the respective scenario. For example, the security requirements for a
WSN deployed for wildlife monitoring may not be as high as for a WSN used in
health-care. Security certainly is also important for applications such as military
or police networks, emergency response, or safety-critical business operations. For
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example, after a natural disaster like a tornado, hurricane, flood, or earthquake,
WSNs could be deployed for real-time safety feedback to assist the rescue teams.
2.3 Characteristics of WSN
A WSN is composed of a large number of low-cost sensor nodes (SNs) and one or
several sink nodes or Base Stations (BS) [SACO06]. SNs are typically small wire-
less devices with limited computational power, radio transmission range, storage
size, battery power, as well as attached sensing devices. Sink nodes are distin-
guishing devices with powerful computation capacity, large memory size, high
power energy and long communication range so as to collect data from SNs. Sink
nodes act as the gateway between WSNs and the end user. Due to a lack of
infrastructure, SNs need to cooperate with each other so as to maintain link and
routing information. Each SN not only acts as a host, but also as a router for
data forwarding.
If the network consists of all the same kind of sensor nodes, it is called homoge-
neous. Some applications require different kinds of nodes. In this case the sensor
network is called heterogeneous. A heterongenous network makes also sense, if
some nodes must perform more tasks and services than others, i.e. these nodes
take a special role in the network. These specialized nodes are called cluster-
heads. Typical tasks of a cluster-head is to store information about nodes in its
cluster group, e.g. what type of sensor data this group can provide, to collect
periodically or in occurrence of certain events all sensor data and generate col-
lective report, and as well as to route foreign messages through the inter-cluster
network. In most security architectures, the cluster-head manages also security
keys used to encrypt and decrypt messages.
Generally, a WSN has the following characteristics [SACO06]:
• Ad Hoc Deployment: SNs are deployed randomly and hence they do not
fit into a conventional topology. Once deployed, they usually do not re-
quire any human intervention. Hence, the networks should be self recon-
figurable and the setup and maintenance of the network should be entirely
autonomous.
• Dynamic Network Topology: SNs may run out of energy (die) or new nodes
may be added to the network. Hence, the network connectivity changes
with time, resulting in dynamically changing network topology.
• Energy Constrained Operation: SNs are usually battery powered and de-
ployed in an unattended area. The exhausted batteries cannot be replaced
after the deployment. Hence, any protocol designed should take the energy
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as a major constraint. WSNs are also constrained in terms of computational
complexity and storage.
• Infrastructure-less: WSNs are primarily infrastructure-less. There is no
central authority to monitor SNs.
• Shared Bandwidth: The radio channel in a WSN is typically broadcasted in
nature and is shared by all the nodes within its direct transmission range.
So, a malicious node could easily obtain access to the data being transmitted
in the network.
• Large scale of deployment: A WSN is a large-scale network, in which thou-
sands of sensors are randomly deployed to monitor surrounding environment
or track a particular object.
• Unattended Operation: WSNs are usually deployed in a hostile environ-
ment, and operating in unattended mode. The exhausted or damaged nodes
cannot be recharged or replaced after deployment.

3 Related Work
Research in wireless sensor networks has reached a high popularity in the past
years. Countless projects exist elaborating different aspects of algorithms, opti-
mizations, features, and applications. The research areas are mainly concentrated
on energy efficient communication, code mobility, localization, operating systems,
and security. There is no research work which combines all of these attributes
together in one system architecture. This thesis is the first approach to develop
an innovative system for wireless sensor networks that is energy-efficient and of-
fers features for security, localization and mobility. This chapter surveys projects
from each of these related areas.
3.1 Energy Efficient Communication
Regarding MAC protocols for wireless communication there are two different
approaches: TDMA (Time Division Multiple Access) and contention-based pro-
tocols. In TDMA each node has its own time slot within a frame where only itself
can send or receive messages depending on the protocol. The message exchange is
handled on the basis of schedules which repeat periodically. In contention-based
protocols there are no time restrictions for message transfer. Each node can ac-
cess concurrently the medium at any time. The protocol tries to avoid collisions
and when collisions appear it resolves them.
The most common contention-based protocol is defined in the IEEE 802.11 stan-
dard. Although not designed for wireless sensor networks it is the most common
protocol in wireless communication. The only energy-saving feature of IEEE
802.11 is the avoidance of collisions. Some wireless sensor protocols are direct
descendants of IEEE 802.11.
The Sensor-MAC (S-MAC) protocol [YHE02] is one of them. S-MAC is a slot-
based protocol where each sensor node has alternating sleep and awake phases.
The network is divided into clusters and all members of a cluster are awake or
asleep at the same time. During sleep phase, the node turns off its radio, and
sets a timer to awake itself later. All cluster nodes exchange schedules in an
initial phase. A node becomes a follower if it receives a schedule from one of
its neighbors. A synchronizer is a node that didn’t get any foreign schedules
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and decides to build its own schedule. This ensures that within a cluster only
one schedule is used, i.e. the schedule of the first node, the synchronizer. If a
node receives more than one different schedules it follows all of them. Such nodes
are members of multiple clusters and have a higher energy consumption, because
they have to be awake for each schedule. Within an awake phase all cluster
nodes contend with each other for medium access. The contention mechanism of
S-MAC is the same as that in IEEE 802.11, i.e., using RTS (Request To Send)
and CTS (Clear To Send) packets. The medium is assigned to the node who first
sends out the RTS, and the receiver replies with a CTS packet. S-MAC needs
a strict timer synchronization in order to achieve correct functionality. Periodic
synchronization among neighboring nodes is performed to correct their clock drift.
An extension of S-MAC by adaptive listening is described in [YHE04]. If a node
A notices an ongoing communication of node B whom it wants to send a message,
it sleeps the time until B is ready.
A modification of S-MAC called Timeout-MAC or T-MAC is introduced in
[vDL03]. In S-MAC all nodes need to be awake in the contention phase even if
they have nothing to send or receive. T-MAC uses a specific timer TA to shorten
the awake phase if the node does not need to communicate. Obviously the TA is
smaller than the contention phase, thus the energy consumption is reduced. But
if the timer TA is chosen too small the node sleeps early missing possible message
requests of other nodes. This early sleeping problem could even lead to unfairness.
In further extensions of T-MAC this problem is solved by future request to send
(FRTS) messages, but this increases again the energy consumption. Nevertheless
T-MAC gains better energy results compared to S-MAC.
The Etiquette protocol described in [GI04] is a TDMA protocol and doesn’t use
synchronized awake cycles like in S-MAC and T-MAC. The idea is that each node
announces its own office hours where it is ready to communicate. These time
slots are established in the initial phase in the way, that neighboring nodes do
not have overlapping slots. Thus, the collision risk is minimized, but at the same
time the number of slots is increased. This has the negative effect of increasing
latency. On the other hand Etiquette has a very good energy balance.
Token ring [IEE85] can be classified as a combination of TDMA and contention-
based. Each node has its own time slot (token holding time) where it has to
manage the communication with multiple contending nodes. The Wireless To-
ken Ring Protocol (WTRP) [ELSV04] comes close to our approach proposed in
chapter 4. WTRP was developed for mobile ad-hoc networks. All nodes build a
single ring in the initial phase. The aim of WTRP is to maximize the throughput
and minimize the latency without restraining the mobility. Energy efficiency is
not considered in WTRP because the nodes are mobile devices with strong en-
ergy resources like Laptops or PDAs. A mapping of WTRP on wireless sensor
networks is E2WTRP that is described in [DLWW04]. E2WTRP aims to en-
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hance the energy balance by dynamic adaptation of the token holding time. An
active node can send more messages if the token holding time is increased. The
frequency of token hand-over is decreased at the same time that reflect in lower
energy consumption.
3.2 Code Mobility in WSN
Although there was an initial excitement about the idea of mobile agents in the
late nineties, there are only a few projects that exist concerning agent systems on
wireless sensor networks. The most famous project in this area is Agilla [FRL05]
[FRL06].
Agilla is a mobile agent middleware for wireless sensor networks. It offers a special
extension for TinyOS, an open source operating system for embedded systems.
The aim of Agilla is to create mobile agents and to allow them to spread out
their code and current status over a wireless sensor network. Through this local
control, the mobile agents obtain more flexibility to find an optimal position for
application specific tasks. Based on the multitasking ability of TinyOS, Agilla
allows to run several agents on a single sensor node. The number of possible
agents differs depending on the local memory capacity. Each agent is autonomous
but shares various resources of the middleware with other agents, i.e. a neighbor
list and a tuple space. The neighbor list contains the addresses of neighboring
nodes. Mobile agents use this list for planning their next migration. The tuple
space offers a decoupled communication capability among agents. It forms a
shared memory architecture, where addressing is performed over defined field
names instead of memory addresses. A tuple describes a typified data object.
All tuples exist even if the inserting agent does not exist any more. Another
agent could later reuse the data in the remaining tuple. In this manner the
tuple decouples the sending agent from the receiving agent. Neither knowledge
about the location nor the existence of the communication partner is required.
For the implementation of agents Agilla uses a stack-based assembler language.
This approach is the main disadvantage of Agilla, since even the programming
of simple applications is really hard and needs a lot of code lines. Complex
applications are nearly impossible. First step to enhance this was to provide
a higher programming language which is automatically transformed in Agilla
code. But still only simple command sequences are possible. Another weakness
of Agilla lies in the realization of the tuple space. In a wireless environment it is
obvious that inconsistencies can arise. Due to connection failures data could not
be reached or several tuples with the same value could exist. A global tuple space
would be a solution but would contradict to energy and resource requirements of
wireless sensor networks. Agilla was established and tested on the sensor boards
20 Related Work
Mica2 and MicaZ, that have more extensive hardware resources than the sensor
boards used in this work.
Another project that uses code mobility but not in the manner of mobile agents
is Contiki [DGV04] [DFEV06]. It is an open source operating system for an 8-
bit controller. Contiki is implemented in the language C and is already ported
to several microcontroller. It is not an agent system but it offers the possibil-
ity to dynamically re-programm sensor nodes during runtime using mobile code
approach. The code itself can not trigger the migration instead it is pushed by
the underlying middleware. Contiki was designed for embedded systems with
extremely low memory capacity. A typical Contiki configuration uses only 2
kilobytes of RAM and 40 kilobytes of ROM. The operating system consists of
a simple event-triggered kernel, where applications can be loaded and unloaded
dynamically at runtime. The processes of Contiki uses the so called protothreads,
which provide optional preemptive multitasking. Inter-process communication
is performed using message passing through events. Sensor nodes can commu-
nicate over a reduced TCP/IP stack called uIP. Contiki uses the standardized
ELF -format [ELF95] for the dynamic binding and loading of code.
3.3 Location Estimation and Tracking
The Active Badge system [WHFG92] was an inspiration for several following
projects. The goal of the Active Badge project was to easily locate persons in
public buildings like hospitals. An application is to forward incoming phone calls
to the current room phone near to the person’s location. The active badges are
devices worn and used to identify the person by sending out an infrared signal
every 100 milliseconds. The use of common IR technology holds the production
costs low. Active badges have a range of 6 meters and can run on battery almost
for one year. Additional energy saving approaches can achieve a fourfold increase
in service time. A network of sensors attached in each room receive the signals
sent by these badges. Each sensor network is able to contain as many as 128
sensors which are connected to a workstation over a serial port. The workstations
themselves are connected to a master that gathers and controls all sensor data.
The Active Badge system can locate persons or objects in a room-wide range,
but the resolution is very low and not sufficient. Another weak point is the
high installation cost since all of the controlled area needs to be wired up, and
extensions are hardly possible.
The RADAR project is a location tracking system based on wireless LAN [BP00].
RADAR is established in an area of 980m2 with more than 50 rooms. Three base
stations are used to cover the whole building, where the coverage of stations
partially overlap. A laptop with a WLAN adaptor works as a mobile device
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for locating and tracking. The laptop sends multiple UDP packets to the base
stations that calculate signal strength and signal-to-noise ratio for each packet.
It first builds a reference model with measurements consisting of 70 points in
the building with data for each direction (north, west, south, east). RADAR
stores at least 20 values of signal strength for each combination of location and
direction. Additionally, it calculates the means, standard deviation, and median
for each position. The accuracy of RADAR is similar to the Active Badge system.
It is only possible to locate people in rooms. But the installation cost is lower,
since most buildings provide WLAN access infrastructures. The calculation of
reference data is the main disadvantage of RADAR. Each change in the room
structure requires an update of the reference model.
Another project that uses WLAN for location tracking is described in [LBR+02].
This approach is similar to RADAR but uses a Bayesian interference algorithm
for statical evaluation based on a specific model of state and observation spaces.
The mean deviation could be improved compared to RADAR. Nevertheless this
approach is also highly dependant on the room structure. Even small changes
lead to large number of re-calculations of the reference model.
[HHS+02] presents another approach for location and identification of objects
based on ultrasound. Each person or object carries a device called bat that
sends periodically an ultrasonic signal. Receivers of this signal are ultrasonic
receiver units which are attached to fixed positions on the ceiling. These units
are interconnected to a daisy-chained network. Using base stations, the ID of
a corresponding bat, which needs to be localized, can be sent over a wireless
connection. The bat responds with the ultrasonic signal. Using different arriving
times at different receiver units, the location of the bat can be calculated. This
project shows that ultrasound provides high precision for location. On the other
hand ultrasound is interference-prone. Other signals can easily jam the ultrasonic
signal. Since also in this project the installation cost is very high, it is difficult
to extend the system infrastructure.
Cricket [SBGP04] is another ultrasonic based location system. In this approach
the device carried by the person determines itself the location. This ensures the
privacy of the person. Beacons attached to the ceiling periodically send a radio
and ultrasonic signal. Using multiple signals from different beacons the personal
device calculates the current position. In further work, Cricket was extended to
provide a tracking of moving objects. An outlier rejection component is used to
eliminate measurement failures by deleting extremal values. Another component
is the least square solver which has the task of minimizing squared mean failures.
Current states are stored by an extended Kalman-filter that can even predict
future states. The installation cost of Cricket is lower than other projects, but
the interference problem of ultrasonic remains.
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The technology of active RFID (Radio Frequency Identifier) tags is used in
[NLLP04]. The aim of the LANDMARC project is to build a cheap location sys-
tem that does not need sight contact and is insensitive to environment changes.
LANDMARC uses RFID readers with a range of 150 feet. The range could be
extended with specific antennas to 1000 feet. Additionally, the readers have an
interface for wireless ethernet that allows flexible positioning. Each reader has
eight reading ranges which can be changed incrementally. The reader can read
out up to 500 tags in 7.5 seconds within each range. In a test scenario, four
readers are attached in a large room. Since there is no possibility to get the
signal strength, the readers have to scan all eight ranges sequentially. LAND-
MARC sends detected tags over wireless connection to a central computer. Using
reference measurements, it calculates the location of the tags. The results show
that LANDMARC is insensitive for changes in the environment, like persons in
the area. The main disadvantage of LANDMARC is the sequential scan of all
reading ranges that takes nearly one minute for each turn. Also the readers are
relatively expensive, which affects the installation cost.
3.4 Security in WSN
Research in this area focuses basically on three security aspects: key management,
secure routing, and verification of sensor data. This section describes related
approaches that are relevant for each aspect and can be used in wireless sensor
networks.
Critical factor in key management is secure and efficient distribution of keys to
sensor nodes. Because of limited resources in sensor networks usually symmetric
keys are used. Symmetric encryption requires that both communicating nodes
know the same secret key.
Key Management: [CPS04] presents secure key distribution techniques for
sensor networks. In particular, two approaches are described: single network-wide
key and pair-wise shared key. The simplest method of key distribution is to pre-
load a single network-wide key onto all nodes before deployment. Storage cost is
minimal because each node has to store only one key. There is no communication
needed to distribute the key. Unfortunately this approach provides sufficient
security only if all nodes are protected against physical force. But this usually
does not apply to low cost sensor nodes. An alternative method would be to
distribute securely the secret key in the initial phase and after that delete all
relevant information on nodes. However, new nodes can not join the network
after this phase. The pair-wise shared key approach requires that every node in
the sensor network shares a unique symmetric key with every other node. Hence,
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in a network of n nodes there are a total of
(
n
2
)
unique keys, whereas each node
has to store n− 1 keys. The storage cost is proportional to the total number of
nodes in the network. Therefore, the pairwise key scheme does not scale well for
large sensor networks.
In [PST+02] a security protocol for sensor networks called SPINS was presented
for hierarchical sensor networks with one or more trustworthy base stations.
SPINS consists of two parts: a secure network encryption protocol (SNEP) and
authenticated broadcasts (µTESLA). SNEP provides the security properties con-
fidentiality, authenticity, integrity, and timeliness. Each sensor node u receives
on a secure channel an individual, symmetric master key, Ku which is only known
by the base station and the node. Using this master key the sensor node is able
to generate all keys Kiu by performing a one-way function F : K
i
u = FKu(i). Stor-
age cost for keys remains low, because each node has to store a fixed amount
of keys independent of the network size. No additional communication between
base station and node is needed, because each one can generate the keys inde-
pendently. The disadvantage of SNEP is that secure communication can be built
only between a base station and nodes, and it is not possible to protect the com-
munication in or between clusters. The second part of SPINS is µTESLA that
provides sending of authenticated broadcasts. For symmetric encryption, sender
and receiver must share the same secret. Consequently, a compromised receiver is
able to act as a designated sender by transferring forged messages to all receivers.
In order to ensure authenticated broadcasts, an asymmetry between sender and
receiver is needed. µTESLA uses delayed disclosure of symmetric keys for gener-
ating an asymmetry between sender and receiver. This approach requires weak
time synchronization of sender and receiver in order to achieve time shifted key
disclosure. Storage cost increases because each node has to buffer packets which
it can only verify after receiving the key in the future time-slots. Also, this
causes new possibilities for DoS-attacks. An attacker can force a buffer over-
flow by sending planned broadcasts. Furthermore µTESLA leads to scalability
problems, which are described in [LN04].
An important aspect for sensor networks is that different communication pat-
terns exist requiring different security steps. [ZSJ03] suggests an adjusted key
distribution for different security requirements. For this reason, four different
kinds of keys are used. The individual key is similar to the master key of SPINS.
The second kind of key is a pair-wise shared key, which is generated in the initial
phase for each known neighbor. Furthermore, the nodes have a cluster key for
secure communication between cluster members. The last key is the group key
that is used for secure broadcasting. This approach provides more flexibility but
contains a security risk during the initial key distribution phase.
Secure Routing: Compromised sensor nodes can influence a sensor network,
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especially by manipulating of routing information. In order to minimize the
impact, [DHM06] suggests intrusion tolerant routing in wireless sensor networks
called INSENS. The goal is to provide a working network even if parts of it are
infiltrated. INSENS contains two phases: route discovery and data forwarding.
In the first phase, the base station sends out a broadcast to build routes to
each node. After receiving the route request, the nodes send a list of all known
neighbors back to the base station. For the last step, the base station generates
several disjoint paths to each node and sends this routing information back to all
network members. Based on this routing table, the nodes can forward data to the
base station (data forwarding phase). INSENS prevents the network against most
outsider attacks and even insider attacks remain locally. But the dependance
on the base station suggests a single point of failure. Furthermore, the route
discovery phase is extremely energy inefficient.
Another approach for secure routing called ARRIVE is presented in [KLP02].
The routing algorithm tries to send packets over different paths based on proba-
bility. Also, nodes in ARRIVE listen passively to communication among neigh-
bors. In case of detected failures, other nodes can forward the packet on behalf
of its neighbor. ARRIVE works with smaller routing tables, but the chosen path
is not always optimal. Furthermore, ARRIVE does not provide authenticated
broadcasts, that provides a mechanism for manipulation of routing information.
Verification of Sensor Data: Each individual sensor node is potential target
for attackers. Using compromised nodes, an attacker can directly influence the
sensor network by infiltrating false reports of network sensor data. This kind
of attack is called fabrication report attack. These fake reports can reach the
base station, if they remain undetected, where they can trigger off false alarms.
Also this causes high consumption of bandwidth and energy. En-route filtering
attempts to verify reports on the way from sending node to the base station.
The goal is to detect and discard false reports earlier. [ZSJN04] describes an
interleaved hop-by-hop authentication scheme for filtering of injected false data.
This algorithm recognizes infiltrated reports by a deterministic process, as long
as no more than t nodes are compromised. The sensors build clusters with a
minimum of t + 1 nodes, where each group chooses a cluster head C. Only
the cluster heads can send collected events in the form of reports to the base
station. These reports include additionally to the actual event t+ 1 independent
confirmations of the respective parties, in order to verify the authenticity of the
report. Each intermediate node checks the report on the way to the base station
(En-route filtering). Unfortunately, this approach uses single path routing to the
base station providing several security risks. A statistical en-route filtering is
presented in [YLLZ05] that enhances the approach above by using probabilistic
algorithms. Each node chooses randomly a number of keys from a partition of a
global key pool. Because of the probabilistic distribution of keys, any node can
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verify with a certain probability a report before it is forwarded. In this manner,
[YLLZ05] supports multi-path routing. But in both approaches, an attacker can
create any report, once it has compromised at least t nodes. [YYY+05] attempts
to solve this problem by binding keys to the location of nodes. The sensor area is
divided into cells of width c, whereas each cell contains several keys. The nodes
receive a location-bound key for each sensing cell. This approach bounds reports
to their original location.

4 Energy-Efficient
Communication
Many sensor nodes depend on battery energy that should preferably last a long
time. Even if a sensor node has an alternative energy source, like in EnOcean
[EnO07], the energy is so small that energy saving remains essential. In most
applications battery replacements are not feasible because of the great number of
sensor nodes or the unknown or unaccessible location. Imagine a scenario where
sensor nodes are spread out from an airplane.
A sensor node consumes most of the energy in its active mode. The energy cost
rises enormously if the node uses radio communication. The energy consumption
of the microprocessor Texas Instruments MSP430F149, which is used in several
sensor boards, is 1.6 µA in sleep mode and rises to 280 µA in active mode at
1 MHz. In [YHE02] the energy rate between active:receive:send is determined
as 1:1.05:1.4, i.e. the energy consumption of sending a message outweighs other
tasks. It is plausible that the energy consumption can be highly decreased by
establishment of sleep intervals and avoidance of unnecessary packet sending.
Using sleep intervals can lead to a contrary effect, i.e. the data exchange is
reduced to a shorter time, which can cause higher packet collisions and increase
energy consumption.
The Energy Saving Token Ring Protocol (ESTR) proposed in this thesis maxi-
mizes the lifetime of the overall wireless sensor network by using sleep intervals
[BUB08a]. The nodes in ESTR are connected to a ring where a token is passed
along. The node that holds the token is allowed to communicate to other nodes
and can control the communication if there are several nodes contending with
each other. Other nodes that do not need to communicate sleep in the mean-
time. ESTR avoids idle-listening and overhearing, i.e. the receiving of foreign
messages where the node is not the recipient. Unfortunately sleep phases decrease
the throughput and increase the communication latency. In order to remain flex-
ible ESTR offers the possibility to set the maximum size of a ring and allows to
build multiple interconnected rings. By changing this parameter you can balance
between energy-saving on the one side and throughput and latency on the other
side. The token in ESTR has a special field for energy information. Each node
fills this field with its own energy level before it sends the token to its next neigh-
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bor. The successive node can adapt his sleep period based on the energy level
of its predecessor. This mechanism offers a dynamic self-optimization where the
ring balances the overall energy and increases its lifetime.
4.1 The ESTR Protocol
The Energy Saving Token Ring Protocol is based on the idea of the wireless token
ring protocol, but chooses a different communication mechanism and introduces
energy-efficient techniques. ESTR assumes that sensor nodes can not change
their location if attached to the environment. New nodes can join the sensor
network or some sensors can fail due to energy loss, but this is not assumed to be
in an ad hoc manner like in mobile ad hoc communication networks. Using sleep
phases is still the best approach to save energy. ESTR introduces sleep periods
for sensor nodes which does not need to send or receive messages. Thus nodes
spend less time in active mode and even receive less foreign messages reducing
the overhearing problem.
Usually in token rings only the node which holds the token is allowed to send
messages. In ESTR we have reversed this communication scheme by allowing
the token holding node to receive messages, because the reception consumes less
energy than the sending.
Using sleep periods leads to a problem because nodes don’t necessarily know if
the neighbor is awake or not. This problem rises if the two nodes are in different
neighboring rings. Since the token is sent in a message the node has to be sure
that its neighbor receives the message. To ensure full token ring functionality,
ESTR offers solutions for token loss, multiple tokens, and node failures that are
described below.
4.1.1 Network Structure and Configuration
The sensor network in ESTR can consist of one large ring or multiple smaller rings
that are interconnected. Each structure has its advantages and disadvantages.
One ring built by all nodes comes close to the original Token Ring, but this is
not always possible and depends on the location of nodes. Imagine a sensor node
with only one neighbor where the role of predecessor and successor is given to
one single node. As long as all nodes can reach each other, we can first build a
tree structure to determine the Eulerian cycle as a ring structure. Since we use
radio transmission, the edges in the tree are undirected. That means that the
father node and son node in the tree can reach each other, as seen in Figure 4.1.
The Eulerian cycle is obtained by visiting each node of the tree in accordance
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to a depth-first search and putting the edges in visited order to a path together.
The path starts and ends at the root and reaches all nodes of the tree. This
leads to some nodes that are visited more often than others, if they have several
children, but it creates a circular structure. Another possibility is to modify the
algorithm of WTRP so that the predecessor and successor nodes for a new node
can be the same. This allows the integration of nodes in the ring, which can only
reach one node. In both algorithms one node needs to be declared as root which
initializes the ring structure. The modified WTRP solution costs less energy,
since no additional messages need to be sent to organize the ring structure. The
Eulerian ring algorithm on the other hand brings more structure in the ring,
which can be used for further improvement.
Figure 4.1: Eulerian cycle
The process of building multiple interconnected rings except for some minor
changes is similar to the process of building one large ring. First, each node
in the network has to be a potential root of a ring, i.e. after a random time the
node decides itself to create a ring if it didn’t receive an invitation from an ex-
istent ring in its vicinity (see Figure 4.2). Interconnected rings require advanced
collision handling, since foreign messages can cross ring borders. The number of
collisions also increases in the initialization phase, as several rings are built in
parallel causing more message traffic. On the other hand, building smaller rings
reduces initialization time.
In ESTR we can control the number of rings in the network by setting a maximum
size of ring members for each node. Within the initialization phase the root node
sends invitation messages until the maximum size of members is reached. In order
to finish this initial process there is an initialization timer. After it expires, each
ring remains with the obtained number of members, even if the maximum is not
reached. Controlling the size has a direct effect on the latency and throughput
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Figure 4.2: Multiple interconnected rings
of the network. It is application dependent which results in a ring size.
4.1.2 Node Communication
As mentioned above in ESTR only the node that holds the token receives mes-
sages from neighboring nodes. After expiration of the token holding time (THT )
the current node A has to hand over the token to its next ring neighbor B. In
order to be sure that B is awake and able to receive the token, A waits for a Midle
message from B. If A receives this messages in the time of TwaitMax it forwards
the token to B. The time TwaitMax is two times longer than the maximum sleep
period of the nodes TsleepMax to ensure enough time for token hand-over.
If node B doesn’t receive the token after sending Midle, it repeats the Midle mes-
sage. If the token is still missing after TwaitMax, B stops sending Midle assuming
that its predecessor failed. On the other side node A will only go asleep when
B stops to send the awake message Midle ensuring that the token is received
correctly. Through this secure transmission a token can only be lost if the to-
ken holder fails or if the token holder cannot reach its neighbor in TwaitMax. In
both cases the process of token recovery is the same. If the token could not be
transferred in the designated time, either the token holder or the token expect-
ing node will induce the dissolution and then the reorganization of the ring by
sending respective messages. If the network consists of multiple smaller rings the
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reorganization is executed with only few messages.
Nevertheless delay or failure in communication can lead to the case that more than
one token can exist in the ring. In order to solve this problem each token has two
numbers: the sequence number (SN) and the generation sequence number (GSN).
SN is used to count the number of passed nodes. GSN can only be increased
by the root and counts the number of rounds. A node deletes all tokens with a
SN or GSN smaller than the last sent token. The root which can only change
GSN , deletes all multiple tokens.
Assuming that there is no node failure and the token is transferred correctly from
A to B, the communication can go on. In this case, node A sends its data to B,
since B as the new token holder is now allowed to receive data. B acknowledges
each received data packet by sending an ACK message. Figure 4.3 describes the
message exchange.
3 Das ESTR-Protokoll
Errichtung einer speziellen Struktur wie den eulerschen Kreis ausgegeben werden
mu¨ssen.
Weiterhin kann u¨ber die maximale Anzahl an Knoten in einem Ring die Variante
mit mehreren Ringen an die Variante mit einem Ring angena¨hert werden.
Bei der Implementierung mit wenigen Knoten ist die Verwendung eines einzigen
großen Ringes von Vorteil, da im Regelfall kleine Ringe eine Erho¨hung der Nach-
richtenkollisionen bedeuten.
Bei einer großen Anzahl an Knoten allerdings steigt die Latenz bei einem einzigen
Ring sta¨rker als bei der Verwendung mehrerer Ringe und es kann zum U¨berlaufen in
den Nachrichtensend puffern kommen. Ob nun ein großer Ring oder mehrere kleine
Ringe fu¨r die Implementierung verwendet werden, ist abha¨ngig von der Anzahl an
Knoten in dem Netzwerk, aber auch von der Datenu¨bertragungsrate.
3.4 Nachrichtenaustausch
Knoten A ist im Besitz des Token fu¨r seinen Ring und will es an seinen Nachfol-
ger Knoten B weiterreichen. A wartet dann, wie bereits beschrieben, auf die Midle
Nachricht von B, wie in Bild 3.3 zu sehen. Sobald diese kommt, schickt A das Token.
Sollte B das Token nicht erhalten, wird er versuchen durch erneutes Verschicken
von Midle an A das Token zu erhalten. Hat B das Token, wird er auf die Daten von
A warten. Die ankommenden Datenpakete wird B dabei mit einer ACK-Nachricht
beantworten. Schickt A keine neuen Daten mehr, du¨rfen die Knoten an B Nach-
richten schicken, die sich in Nachbarringen befinden.
Abbildung 3.3: Tokenweitergabe bei ESTR-Protokoll
Dazu warten sie nach dem letzten Datenpaket von A eine Zeit zufa¨llig lange Dau-
er, damit ihr Sendewunsch mit den Sendewu¨nschen anderen Knoten aus anderen
Ringen nicht kollidiert. Dann schicken sie einen Sendewunsch und - hat B noch
genug Zeit und kein Sendewunsch ist vorher bei B eingegangen - erhalten sie eine
Sendeerlaubnis. Das la¨sst sich mit dem im vorhergegangen Kapitel vorgestellten
RTS/CTS-Verfahren, hier in Bild2.2 gezeigt, verwirklichen.
C ist der Knoten, der Senderecht von B erhalten hat. Die Knoten, die zwar an B
senden wollen, aber nicht die Erlaubnis erhalten haben, horchen das Medium ab,
wann der Datenaustausch zwischen B und C beendet ist, und dann versuchen sie
ihrerseits wieder das Senderecht von B zu erhalten.
Da A außer Funkreichweite von Knoten aus anderen Ringen, die an B senden wol-
len, sein kann, kann es sein, dass diese Knoten das Senden des Token von A nach
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Figure 4.3: Token hand-over and message exchange
Other nodes from neighbor rings that desire to s data to B, have to wait
until A has no more packets to transfer. This initiates the contention-based
phase of ESTR. After the last packet of A the other nodes set a random timer
before they send a request to B. Node B decides if it has enough time before
THT expires and sends a permission to the first node. This process reflects the
RTS/CTS-approach of IEEE 802.11 that is also used in S-MAC and T-MAC.
Th nodes cyclically ange t eir state uring the lifetime in or er to r act cor-
rectly to incoming messages. All possible states and transitions are described in
Figure 4.4. After the initial phase all nodes are in the sleep-state except for the
root node which generates the token at first. The root is in the state sendToken.
As soon as its successor awakes, it changes to the waitToken. After the state
sendData a node can either go to sleep or wait for another node in a neighboring
ring if it wants to send data to it. In some cases, a node could miss its sleep phase
waiting for other nodes and changes directly to the waitToken state. Figure 4.5
shows all sections of the awake phase.
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3.4 Nachrichtenaustausch
B nicht mitbekommen. Deswegen ist es notwendig, dass B bei der U¨bergabe des
Token selber eine Nachricht, die Midle-Nachricht, verschickt, damit die Knoten aus
anderen Ringen in jedem Fall u¨ber den Zustand von B Bescheid wissen.
Die Knoten wechseln wa¨hrend ihrer Lebenszeit zyklisch in mehrere Zusta¨nde u¨ber,
damit sie in den jeweiligen Phasen korrekt auf eingehende Nachrichten reagieren
ko¨nnen. Die mo¨glichen Zusta¨nde und ihre U¨berga¨nge sind in Bild 3.4 zu sehen.
Die Knoten sind anfangs im Zustand sleep, außer einem Knoten A, der das Token
hat und der Ringbesitzer ist. Dieser befindet sich im Zustand sendToken. Sobald
sein Nachfolger B aufwacht, geht dieser in den Zustand waitToken u¨ber und schickt
eine Midle-Nachricht. Sobald B das Token hat, geht B in den Zustand waitData
u¨ber. A dagegen, der nun keine Midle-Nachricht mehr erha¨lt, wechselt in den Zu-
stand sendData u¨ber und sendet nun Daten an B. Sobald A keine Daten mehr zu
verschicken hat, geht er schlafen. Hat A noch Daten fu¨r einen oder mehrere Knoten
in einem oder mehreren der benachbarten Ringe, wird er seine Schlafphase ganz
oder nur teilweise dafu¨r aufgeben und auf das Erwachen des Empfa¨ngers im ande-
ren Ring zu warten.
Hat A seine Schlafphase dadurch verpasst, geht er gleich von sendData in waitTo-
ken u¨ber, ansonsten in den Zustand sleep. Knoten B hat das Token und wird nun
wie A seinen Zustandszyklus weiter behandeln, also auf die Midle-Nachricht seines
Nachfolgers warten. Die Unterteilungen der Wachphase e nes Knotens sind auch in
Bild 3.5 zu sehen.
Abbildung 3.4: Zustandsdiagramm der MAC-Schicht bei ESTR
Umso gro¨ßer nun die Ringe sind, umso gro¨ßer ist die Latenz und umso geringer
ein mo¨glicher Durchsatz, sollte man von Kollisionen absehen. Diese wiederum sind
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Figure 4.4: State chart of the ESTR-MAC-level
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Abbildung 3.5: Abschnitte der Wachphase bei ESTR
umso ha¨ufiger, je kleiner die Ringe sind und umso mehr Ringe es gibt, denn nur
der Datenaustausch innerhalb eines Ringes ist synchronisiert.
Außerdem liegen die einzelnen Ringe na¨her beieinander, je kleiner die durchschnitt-
liche Ringgro¨ße ist. Mit der Anzahl an Kollisionen sinkt auch die maximal mo¨gliche
Datenu¨bertragungsrate und die Latenz, so dass die Ringgro¨ße eine entscheidende
Rolle bei der Effizienz des Protokolls spielt. Die maximale Ringgro¨ße wird - wie im
WTRP - vor der Initialisierung des Netzwerkes festgelegt und danach dem Token
immer mitgegeben.
Sollte es nur Ringe mit einem Knoten als Teilnehmer geben, so funktioniert das
ESTR Ring Protokoll genau wie das Etiquette-Protokoll. Damit ist das ESTR eine
Mischung aus dem Etiquette-Protokoll und dem WTRP.
Mit Ausnahme der Initialisierungsphase ist ein Broadcast innerhalb des ESTR nicht
sinnvoll, da die meisten Knoten in der Umgebung des Knotens, der den Broadcast
verschickt, schlafen.
3.5 Routing
Die Aufgabe des Routings fa¨llt nicht in den Bereich des MAC Protokolls, da MAC
Protokolle zusta¨ndig sind fu¨r den geregelten Zugriff auf das Medium und nicht fu¨r
die lokale Bestimmung des na¨chsten Kandidaten.
Falls aber die Sensorknoten in einem Ring angeordnet sind, so werden die Pakete
einfach u¨ber die Ringstruktur weitergeleitet, bis sie bei dem Adressaten angekom-
men sind. Damit ist zusa¨tzliches Routing nicht mehr notwendig.
Bei der Netzwerkstruktur, bei der es mehrere Ringe gibt, wird u¨ber dem MAC-
Protokoll ein weiteres Protokoll benutzt, das in der Network Layer liegt. Dieses
u¨bernimmt das Routing zwischen den einzelnen Ringen. Innerhalb eines Ringes
werden die Nachrichten weiterhin u¨ber die Ringstruktur weitergegeben.
3.6 La¨nge der Schlafpause
Die La¨nge der Schlafpause ist abha¨ngig von der Anzahl an Knoten in dem Ring.
Je mehr Knoten in dem Ring sind, desto la¨nger kann der einzelne Knoten schlafen.
36
Figure 4.5: Sections of the awake phase
4.1.3 Self-optimizing by Dy amic Sleeping
The length of the sleep phase depends on the number of nodes in a ring. The
more nodes are in the ring the longer a single node can sleep. But this affects also
the message transfer time because the path through the ring becomes longer. A
node that has to send many of messages to neighboring rings cannot use its sleep
periods so often and will fail faster due to energy loss. In order to balance the
energy consumption in the ring, ESTR offers a dynamic self-optimizing approach
where nodes can change their sleep duration. ESTR uses the token to transfer
energy information from node to node.
The token holder A uses the energy field of the token to inform the next neighbor
B about its energy level. B increases its sleep duration by a constant factor c
if the remaining energy of node A is factor c higher than the energy level of B.
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The effect of this adaptation is seen as A forwards the token again to B, i.e. in
the next cycle. This time A has to wait longer for B who sleeps longer. If the
energy level between A and B is balanced, B sets back its sleep duration. Since
node A has now a higher energy consumption, it can also adapt dynamically its
sleep duration. Over the time the energy consumption of the entire ring becomes
dynamically balanced, increasing the overall lifetime of the sensor network.
4.2 Evaluation
In order to evaluate the performance of ESTR and to compare it with related
approaches, we used the network simulator NS-2 from University of Berkeley,
California [The07]. The protocol stacks of IEEE 802.11 and S-MAC were already
available in NS-2. We implemented the protocols T-MAC, Etiquette, and WTRP
according to information given by the authors.
4.2.1 Average Energy Consumption
The average energy consumption is an essential factor for the lifetime of the wire-
less sensor network. A high energy consumption leads to faster node losses. We
measured the energy consumption of ESTR in comparison to the other proto-
cols, increasing the number of nodes in the sensor network. Figure 4.6 visualizes
the energy consumption of a wireless sensor network with 20 nodes. The chart
shows clearly that IEEE 802.11 does not have energy saving possibilities except
for CSMA/CD. It loses the most energy as compared to other protocols in this
scenario with 20 nodes.
S-MAC as well as T-MAC have a higher energy consumption compared to 20
nodes because the nodes have to send and receive more messages, e.g. in the syn-
chronization phase. ESTR and Etiquette offer nearly the same energy efficiency.
In ESTR, the network consists of multiple rings, hence, the initialization phase
does not need more time. Regarding the overall results, the average energy con-
sumption increased compared to the smaller network. As a last step we increased
the number of nodes to 500. Figure 4.8 shows that the task of building the rings
takes disproportionately more time.
WTRP cannot manage to build the ring within the defined time of 300 seconds.
After expiration of this time the nodes start to reorder. In a second step we set
up the timeout for building the ring to 400 seconds. Even this was not enough to
manage the initial process, and WTRP loses a large amount of energy after the
timeout. The reason for this is that the remaining nodes try to build their own
ring after 300 seconds. The invitation to join the ring is sent from node to node
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Figure 4.6: Energy efficiency with 20 nodes
It is important to note the high energy loss of Etiquette and ESTR at the begin-
ning. After some time both protocols decrease linearly as S-MAC and T-MAC,
but gaining the best energy results at the end. ESTR as well as WTRP build
only one ring since the maximum number of nodes per ring is set to 30 nodes.
The initialization costs for smaller rings are still acceptable, as clearly seen at
WTRP that has similar results as ESTR and Etiquette. S-MAC is factor of two
better than the 802.11 protocol due to the sleep phases. T-MAC with its timeout
mechanism is even better than S-MAC.
What we can also see here is that even in smaller networks TDMA- and token-
based approaches are more efficient than contention-based protocols. The differ-
ence rises if the number of nodes becomes higher. Figure 4.7 shows the energy
consumption in a networks with 100 nodes. This time WTRP needs more time
for building the token ring.
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Figure 4.7: Energy efficiency with 100 nodes
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Figure 4.8: Energy efficiency with 500 nodes
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in WTRP. This becomes a problem if there are too many nodes. At 100 nodes
WTRP needed 150 seconds to reach each node, at 500 nodes it can not reached
most of them in 300 seconds. Another problem is the calculation of the node
sleep time. In order to compute the sleep phase which depends on the number
of actual nodes, the token has to be passed through the ring at the end of the
initialization. Assuming an awake time of 0.25 seconds and 500 nodes, the token
should take 62.5 seconds for one circulation to conclude the building of the ring.
This is also the reason why ESTR as well as Etiquette are more energy efficient.
ESTR also suffers from having too many nodes. The packet collisions increase
retransmissions, which consume more energy. Also it could be that some roots
cannot get new members since they are surrounded by existing rings. But the
great advantage of ESTR is that these nodes can still communicate as rings
with only one member having their own sleep periods. Thus, the initialization
phase does not need to be extended in ESTR using the same time like in smaller
networks.
In the beginning phase, ESTR seems to consume more energy as WTRP. The
reason is that in ESTR multiple roots try to build rings in parallel. In WTRP
there is only one root that sends invitations to other nodes. But ESTR quickly
compensates this negative energy balance after the initialization.
In the previous evaluations we did not used the self-optimizing mechanism of
ESTR using dynamic sleeping. In order to examine the impact of this feature
for energy consumption, especially the balance of energy between nodes, we ran
some measurements using a network with only 30 nodes.
If a node loses faster energy than its neighbors, then the loss of this node will
impact the network greatly. The remaining nodes will have to take over the tasks
of the lost node. Thus, we consider the node with maximum energy as well as the
node with minimal energy to draw conclusions about the lifetime of the overall
network. Etiquette, ESTR and T-MAC can offer the best results (Figure 4.9).
The proportion between awake and sleep phases have not changed, but ESTR has
now the possibility to balance the energy in the sensor network by dynamically
adapting the sleep phase.
Since the lines of S-MAC and IEEE 802.11 overlap in the chart, the values of
S-MAC can not be recognized directly. The timeout functionality of T-MAC
ensures that the energy of the node with the least energy does not decrease
rapidly compared to S-MAC. In ESTR one can see improvements because of
dynamic sleep adaptation.
The next chart (Figure 4.10) shows the energy quotient. EMin is the energy
minimum at a point in time and EMax is the energy maximum at the same time.
Thus, the energy quotient is EQuot = EMin/EMax. With this value we can see the
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Figure 4.9: Energy minimum in the sensor network
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Figure 4.10: Energy quotient
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relative distance between minimum and maximum of energy. In IEEE 802.11 the
minimum and maximum are always equal. The nodes have no sleep periods and
the number of sent and received packets is for each node the same. S-MAC and
WTRP have the worst results. It is assumed that in S-MAC the synchronizer has
the lowest energy since it has to manage the initialization. Its the same with the
root node in WTRP. The Etiquette protocol does not have a designated node that
leads to a better energy quotient. ESTR can compensate the difference at the
initial phase through dynamic sleeping. In some phases the energy is balanced,
and the minimum and maximum are equal. In T-MAC the energy quotient is
decreasing constantly which means that the minimum and maximum lose the
same amount of energy.
Node B
Node A
Figure 4.11: Ping-pong between two nodes
4.2.2 Communication Latency
Even if the energy consumption is the leading point of ESTR, the latency is
noteworthy. In applications with time-critical events, latency becomes a main
focus. In order to measure the delay we chose a ping-pong communication where
a message is sent from node A to B and immediately back again to A (Figure
4.11).
Especially in ring structures where messages between two physical neighbors often
have to pass all nodes of the ring this approach is more significant than the latency
of single packets. In most of the network structures the latency of a ping-pong
message is determined by halving the transmission time, since the node can reach
each other directly.
In our latency evaluation we used a single ring with 30 nodes. Thus, the results
of ESTR also represent WTRP regarding the latency. We compared our results
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with S-MAC and IEEE 802.11. First we chose two nodes that were physical as
far away as possible. The 802.11 protocol doesn’t have sleep phases, thus it has
the least latency as seen in figure 4.12. The first chart has a large scale, where the
value of 802.11 is not visible. The second chart uses a smaller scale to estimate
the time of 802.11. In ESTR the message is sent in one or two cycles through
the ring. Each cycle consists of awake and sleep phases as mentioned above.
In S-MAC the slots for sending are short. The message has to pass multiple
intermediate nodes. At each station it has to wait another sleep phase to be
forwarded. This results in large delays, if the nodes are far away from each other.
If the physical distance between the nodes is small, e.g. neighboring nodes, the
results change. Figure 4.13 shows the ping-pong times using close-by nodes. In
ESTR nothing changes because the message still has to pass through the whole
ring, even if the nodes are physical neighbors. S-MAC as well as IEEE 802.11
have one third shorter times. In S-MAC there are still sleep phases that result
in transfer delays.
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Figure 4.12: Time for a ping-pong between far nodes
4.2.3 Real-life Tests
Beside the NS2 simulations we implemented ESTR on sensor boards to evaluate
its usability in real-life scenarios. The used hardware was the Embedded Sensor
Board (ESB 430) from the FU Berlin [Sca07]. This sensor board has the micro-
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Figure 4.13: Time for a ping-pong between close nodes
controller TI MSP430, a radio transceiver, and several sensors on board. The
MSP430 is a low-power microcontroller offering four different sleep modes. Thus
the sensor board ESB430 is appropriate to test energy-efficient protocols.
We implemented two scenarios: one ring with three sensor nodes and two rings
with three nodes per ring. One node was always connected over the serial port to
a PC where we could get visual outputs in order to observe the communication.
Figure 4.14 describes the one ring scenario whereas Figure 4.15 shows the two
interconnected rings.
To establish the desired ring structure, we started the nodes successively. The
first node that was attached to the PC became the root. In the first scenario, the
other nodes sent a message to each other every 96 seconds, after joining the ring.
Since every message passed the root, we could follow the ongoing communication.
In the two ring scenario we set the maximum member size to three. Successively
starting of the nodes should result in two different rings interconnected through
one or more nodes. To test the ring-to-ring communication we sent messages
from the root node to all other nodes which answered with an ACK packet.
The firmware of the ESB430 has an interface where you can get the remaining
energy of the battery. This led us to the idea also to measure the energy consump-
tion of ESTR in real-life. We implemented the IEEE 802.11 protocol to compare
the energy usage with ESTR. Since the firmware does not provide accurate energy
values, battery energy is surprisingly lower at the beginning of the measurement
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serial output
Node 1
Node 3
Node 2
Figure 4.14: Real-life scenario with
one ring
serial output
Node 1
Node 3Node 2
Node 6
Node 5
Node 4
Figure 4.15: Real-life scenario with
two interconnected rings
and fluctuates during the time (Figure 4.16). Nevertheless it is clearly seen that
ESTR achieves a better energy balance as IEEE 802.11 although it is a small
network with only three nodes. The main advantage of ESTR becomes apparent
in larger networks.
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Figure 4.16: Energy consumption in real-life

5 Variable Ranges Protocol
The energy consumption of sensor nodes that send with maximum transmission
power lies significantly higher than with reduced power. Decreasing transmission
power results in exponentially decreased energy consumption. Additionally, the
initial state of reduced transmission power of nodes ensures that complexity of
network is low. With high signal strength nodes are confronted with frequent
interferences and redundant paths within the network. Low signal strength means
that number of neighboring nodes is less, i.e. probability for message collisions
decreases.
Base station
Cluster head
Marked Cluster heads
Simple sensor nodes
Cluster
Inter-cluster network
Figure 5.1: Basic sensor network architecture
Often, sensor networks form a hierarchical topology based on clusters, each con-
taining a number of simple sensor nodes and one powerful node that acts as a
cluster-head. Sensor nodes connect directly to the cluster-head, i.e. routing in
clusters is not necessary. Regarding our topology approach in this thesis, we
decided also to build on a cluster architecture. In our view of a sensor network,
a node can be a member of several clusters at the same time. All cluster-heads
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form together an inter-cluster network used for sending messages to base stations.
Furthermore, it is assumed that sensor nodes do not change their position once
they are attached to a location. The network works with multiple base stations
in order to avoid single-point-of-failures (see Figure 5.1).
In first versions of our proposed system, clusters were built in the initial phase
and remained unmodified for the whole lifetime of the network. Furthermore, all
nodes used the same sending configuration, i.e. transmission power and range
were set to maximum on each node. This chapter describes an extension of this
approach with dynamic features. The new variable ranges (VR) protocol op-
timizes the communication range of each node [BKJS11]. Therefore, the VR
protocol saves energy by adjusting and optimizing the signal strength to particu-
lar circumstances of the sensor network in order to extend the lifetime of nodes.
This optimization results in more efficient usage of energy throughout the overall
sensor network [Bag11].
Regarding the security architecture described in the next chapter, the number of
neighbors is also an important parameter. Each cluster-head has to manage sev-
eral keys with each other neighboring sensor node and cluster-head for securing
the communication and ensuring authentication. More neighbors means higher
management effort and more storage space, as well as more encryption and de-
cryption processing. All of this results again in increased energy consumption.
Therefore, it is essential that the security architecture works hand in hand with
the underlying communication protocol.
5.1 Network Establishment
In the initial phase of the VR protocol, the nodes search for neighboring nodes
starting with a minimum signal strength. For this reason, each node sends a
DiscoverNodes message containing its own range parameter and ID. Then the
node waits a certain time to get a response. The waiting time is also dynamic,
i.e. the time is low, if the range is low and increases, if the range increases. The
reason for this is that a node with a low range will reach less neighbors. Therefore,
there is no need to wait a long time for a response. The nodes increase stepwise
their transceiver power and send new discovery messages until a pre-configured
number of nodes is found. A node which receives a DiscoverNodes message of an
unknown node, extracts the range information of its seeking new neighbor. In the
next step, the node compares the received range value with its own range. If the
own range is lower, the node increases its range and sends a DiscoverNodesReply
message back. Since the signal strength of the nodes would increase in this
way until all nodes would settle at the range of the largest distance between
two nodes, the VR protocol performs only a temporary range adjustment. This
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means that nodes discard the adaptation after a certain time and return again
to their previous values.
Figure 5.2: Range adjustment in VR protocol
Figure 5.2 illustrates this adjustment scheme. Assuming a maximum number of
neighbors is set to three in this figure, it would be unfavorable for node y to use
the range parameter of node x, since it can reach three neighbors with a much
lower signal strength. For this reason, y will only increase range temporarily to
answer node x and return to its previous range, in order to proceed with its own
search. Cluster-heads find in this way a minimum number of other cluster-heads
and as well as sensor nodes.
Actually, the aim of each cluster-head is to be reachable through the inter-cluster
network by at least one base station. After the initial phase, each base station
sends a broadcast through the new built network. This sink message is also
important to generate new keys for further authentication. In the next chapter,
this key generation is described in detail. Therefore, reachability of base stations
is essential to establish the security architecture in the sensor network. If a
cluster-head does not receive a broadcast message after a certain time, it starts
a new search phase to find new cluster-heads. The cluster-head uses this time a
different message DiscoverNewNodes. It first uses the current range, since there
could be cluster-heads which are in range, but not discovered. Cluster-heads who
receive such a message, adjust their signal strength to answer, but keep their new
range value this time. If the node does not get any answers, it increases its range
and repeats the procedure until it finds new connections. Figure 5.3 shows the
TryToConnect phase. You can see on the right side of the figure, that after the
initial search phase, several local cluster networks are established, but not all of
them can reach a base station marked here as green squares at the four corners.
On the left picture you can recognize that the connectivity is enhanced after
the TryToConnect phase, but nevertheless there are still local clusters remaining
unreachable by any base station. The reason is that nodes are deployed randomly.
There is a small probability that some nodes cannot reach a base station, even
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if transmission power is set to the maximum or due to message collisions in the
initial phase.
Figure 5.3: Initial phases of VR protocol: a) neighbor search b) TryToConnect
5.2 Probabilistic Routing in VR Protocol
Cluster-heads check periodically their neighborhood for node losses or new arriv-
ing nodes. During lifetime the VR protocol ensures that nodes can dynamically
adapt to changes in their environment. This network adaptation goes hand in
hand with security adjustments.
Additionally, routing information is updated by cluster-heads after each VR ad-
justment phase. Simple sensors do not need routing capability, because they
exclusively communicate with the cluster-head. Routing is used only within the
inter-cluster network established by cluster-heads. Our architecture uses prob-
abilistic multi-path routing based on the level values to forward messages from
cluster-heads on the way to the corresponding base station. Cluster-heads build
up a trust matrix, where each transmission to its neighbors is recorded. Based
on this trust information, cluster-heads calculate a probability value and write it
into the packet header. This value is used to decide in which direction the packet
has to be send. Each cluster-head modifies the probability value and sends the
message over the most trustworthy route.
Furthermore, our architecture provides passive participation, i.e. sensor nodes
listen to packet transmissions of their neighbors. If cluster-head u detects a
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Figure 5.4: The Simulator GUI
packet addressed to its neighbor v, and recognizes that v is not forwarding the
message, u takes responsibility with a certain (low) probability. Also, if u assumes
that v forwards the message to a non-existent node, u takes care of transferring.
5.3 Evaluation
To evaluate the efficiency of our variable ranges security architecture we imple-
mented a simulation tool where it is possible to establish different sizes of sensor
networks. Figure 5.4 shows the GUI of the simulator. The simulation is divided
into three phases: node distribution, initialization of network, and report send-
ing. In the first phase, a predefined number of nodes is distributed randomly over
a given area. Sensor nodes and as well as cluster-heads are deployed after setting
for each a maximum transceiver range.
Basic parameters for the network are total number of nodes, initial node range,
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Figure 5.5: Traffic load in relation to signal strength
initial node energy, and network density. Type, range, and position of nodes can
be changed easily using the simulator GUI. Furthermore, new nodes can be added
or existing nodes can be deleted before the next phase of the simulation is started.
Figure 5.4 shows a screenshot after the first phase. Dark circles are cluster-heads
whereas light dots are simple sensor nodes. The squares at the corners represent
again four base stations. In this case one cluster-head is selected and you can see
the communication range of the current node.
The second phase initializes the network based on a communication protocol. We
implemented three protocols that can be selected by the user in the beginning of
this phase. These are the SMAC protocol, the energy saving token ring protocol
(ESTR), and the variable ranges (VR) protocol. The user can change a set of
parameters depending on the selected communication protocol, e.g. cluster size,
timer settings, update periods. In this phase security and routing information is
exchanged, too.
At the end of initialization, the network is established and nodes can start to
exchange secured messages. This is simulated in the last phase by randomly
generated reports that are sent to base stations. The user can halt the simulation
at any time, in order to change parameters for nodes. For example, one can turn
off a node to simulate a node loss. It is also possible to simulate a compromised
node that sends false reports into the network.
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Nodes consume energy for processing data, like encryption and decryption, and
sending or receiving messages. For some communication protocols nodes can
switch to a sleep mode, where energy consumption is minimal. Our simulator
bases on an energy model that uses specifications of real sensor boards: ESB
430/1 and MSB-430 of Freie University Berlin [Sca07].
In a first evaluation we measured the number of messages sent in the initializa-
tion phase using the VR protocol. We performed several simulations where we
modified the maximum range of nodes in order to get average number of sent
packets, collisions, and lost packets. Figure 5.5 shows the results of a network
with 500 nodes. Traffic load increase with higher range of single nodes, because
nodes can reach more neighbors to exchange messages with.
The VR protocol can be initialized with several parameters. As mentioned in
the previous section, the VR protocol continues to search for new neighbors
by increasing the transmission range. Using the simulator the user can set the
maximum number of neigboring cluster-head and sensor for each node in the
network, e.g. setting the number to three would stop the search after finding
three cluster-heads in the neighborhood. In some cases, this would lead to a
low connectivity, since nodes which could not join a cluster group would be
disclosed. Therefore, VR protocol offers a second optimization step that was
described in the previous section (TryToConnect). Figure 8.6 shows number of
sent packets, packet collisions, and lost packets using different configurations of
VR protocol. The notation Init VR 3-3-ExtCon means that each cluster-head
searches for new neighbors until 3 other cluster-heads and 3 sensor nodes are
found and the TryToConnect mode is turned on. It is clearly seen that packet
collision in VR protocol is very low and there are nearly no packet losses, since the
communication range is very reduced. The less packets are sent, the less energy
is consumed. In Figure 5.6 the configuration Init VR 2-3 noExtCon seems to be
the optimal configuration.
But regarding the connectivity this is not the best choice. Figure 5.7 shows the
connectivity for each configuration. It is clearly seen that the connectivity for
the configuration Init VR 2-3 noExtCon is only %14.15, i.e. only a small number
of cluster-heads can actually reach a base station. Turning on the TryToConnect
modus brings only an increase of %10 in connectivity. Only after increasing the
number of neighboring cluster-heads leads to reasonable results. Even without
the second optimization phase, VR protocol can reach nearly %90 connectivity.
As mentioned in the previous section, the complexity of sensor network is much
lower using VR protocol. On the left side of Figure 5.8 the network was estab-
lished with maximum node range. It is clearly seen that in dense areas of the
network, the number of different connections is rather high. In a second simu-
lation, we used the VR protocol to establish the network. As seen on the right
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Figure 5.6: Traffic load for different configurations of VR protocol
Figure 5.7: Connectivity for different configurations of VR protocol
5.3 Evaluation 51
part of Figure 5.8 using the VR protocol lowers the complexity of the network.
Figure 5.8: Network complexity without (left) and with VR protocol (right)
The optimal usage of signal strength in VR protocol shows its advantages also in
energy consumption. Figure 5.9 illustrates the energy consumption for sending
reports from a sensor node to the base station. Level represents here the distance
between sending node and nearest base station, e.g. level 6 means that messages
traverse six intermediate cluster-heads until they reach the base station.
We performed the energy measurement in four different networks with the same
size. For the first three networks the maximum range parameter of each node
was set to a fixed value, i.e. range 6 stands for %60 maximum signal strength.
The last network used the VR protocol with at least three cluster-head and three
sensor node neighbors and a further optimization step to increase the connectivity
(VR 3-3 ExtCon). One can clearly see that the VR protocol has the best energy
balance leading to a longer lifetime of the network.
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Figure 5.9: Energy consumption for reporting
6 Mobility in WSN
A research field that often integrates wireless sensor networks in their applications
is Ubiquitous Computing. Ubiquitous systems build on the vision that great
amounts of microchips and sensors will be integrated in everyday objects. The
aim of microchips in this area is to support the users in an independent and
invisible way instead of forcing them to adapt to the computerized world. Most
of the devices will be attached to a fixed location whereas some will be mobile
carried by persons. Service development on memory and energy limited devices is
a complex task. An example for a service is a fire detection application on basis of
temperature sensors that are spread out in an area. A program running on such
a device is static and usually limited to a single task. If a new service needs to be
performed each device has to be fundamentally reprogrammed. Regarding the
large number of sensor nodes envisioned for future sensor network applications,
this could lead to an intractable task. Running multiple services on one device is
usually not possible because of memory and performance limitations.
Regarding the decentralized approach, the openness, and heterogeneity of wireless
sensor networks, the paradigm of mobile agents presents itself for ubiquitous
systems. The idea in this thesis is to bring a service on limited devices and
sensors when it’s needed and to switch services dynamically. Imagine a smart
office building that has multiple microcontrollers and sensors integrated in walls,
doors and office equipments, and users who have portable devices as well as
microchips integrated in badges. In the initial state, the microcontrollers perform
no services, but have the possibility to host mobile agents. The service comes in
form of an agent to each device and leaves if it is no longer needed.
Agents in general can be defined as software units with certain autonomy. They
perform services by order of a user or other agents. Mobile agents have an addi-
tional property: they can autonomously migrate, i.e. they can transfer program
code, data and continuation pointer to a remote computer and resume with the
program execution. Beside this physical mobility, mobile agents have the possi-
bility to communicate with each other in order to exchange information.
This chapter elaborates the idea of mobile code in wireless sensor networks. Code
mobility is provided by a mobile agent system for ubiquitous environments called
UbiMASS [BWSU10], [BWUB09]. The mobile agents in UbiMASS can receive
information from the real environment through appropriate interfaces. The light-
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weight design of UbiMASS allows it to run on wireless sensor networks, that
consist of several sensor nodes.
6.1 UbiMASS Architecture
Based on the requirements of ubiquitous agent systems, this section presents the
ubiquitous mobile agent system for sensor networks. UbiMASS describes an agent
middleware, which offers a fundamental basis, to develop a range of applications
from the ubiquitous computing area.
Communication Level
Agent Middleware
Sensor-Actuator Interface
ELF Loader
Migration Engine
Agent
UbiMASS
Figure 6.1: UbiMASS host architecture
The primary goal of UbiMASS is to offer mobile agents the opportunity to dis-
tribute on their own initiative the code, as well, existing data, and the current
state over a wireless sensor network. The agents, using their own local control
and flexibility, perform application specific tasks. It is not necessary to trans-
fer data over an unreliable wireless connection because the agent itself has been
moved to the data. This approach is an elegant and energy-efficient solution for
distributed applications. Calculations proceed only at relevant locations sparing
the entire communication network from useless traffic loads. UbiMASS consists
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of multiple wireless connected agent hosts offering a platform for mobile agents.
A UbiMASS host has a modular architecture with several components. Besides
the management of the agent system, the hosts must run the agent and control
its communication and migration.
Actually the agent middleware has three components: the ELF loader, the Migra-
tion Engine, and the Sensor-Actuator Interface. Figure 6.1 shows the UbiMASS
host architecture.
6.1.1 UbiMASS ELF Loader
The agent system UbiMASS uses the standardized format ELF for dynamic load-
ing of the agent. In the case of a agent migration the middleware calls the loading
method of the ELF loader to begin the execution of the agent. In order to explain
this operation it is necessary to describe at first the basics of the ELF standard.
ELF stands for Executable and Linkable Format, that is basically a standard for
executable files. It is mostly used in UNIX systems where it replaces the old and
unflexible a.out. ELF aims to rearrange the machine code in order to load it
fast and efficiently into the memory for execution. The standard describes how
commands have to be organized, interpreted and loaded. The representation of
control data is, in contrast to other proprietary formats, always platform inde-
pendent. [ELF95] distinguishes between three kinds of ELF files (object files):
• Executable File: This type of file comprises a program that is ready to
be executed. All necessary information to create a new process is available.
This process has access to the code and data within the corresponding file.
• Relocatable File: In this case the file does not contain an executable
program, but only position independent code and data. These can be linked
with other object files to produce an executable program or a dynamic
library.
• Shared Object File: This file comprehends also code and data, that can
be linked on two ways. On the one hand a new object file can be created
using other relocatable or shared object files. On the other hand executable
or shared object files can be used to produce a process image.
The object files are required for binding or linking of the program as well as for
executing the program. Therefore, ELF defines different views of the same file:
linking view and execution view (see Figure 6.2). The linking view constitutes the
file as an alignment of sections. The execution view divides the file into segments.
Each view has a table describing the several sections. Notice that sections and
segments describe actually the same file only from different points of view. The
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Abbildung 4.2: Verschiedene Sichtweisen einer ELF-Datei nach [Exe95]
von Sections und von Segmenten. Zu jeder Ansicht gibt es eine Tabelle, welche
die einzelnen Abschnitte beschreibt  die sog. Section Header Table für die Sec-
tions sowie die Program Header Table für die Segmente. Man beachte, dass die
Sections und Segmente wirklich dieselbe Datei beschreiben, nur aus verschiedenen
Sichten.
Die Sections werden von Compilern, Assemblern und Linkern gebraucht und glie-
dern die Datei in verschiedene Teile. So ist beispielsweise der ausführbare Code in
einer Section .text, alle initialisierten Variablen in einer Section .data, alle nicht
initialisierten in einer Section .bss. Zudem existiert eine String Table, in der alle
Namen von Sections und Symbolen aufgelistet sind. Von essentieller Bedeutung
ist ferner eine weitere Section: die Symbol Table.
Unter dem Begriff Symbol versteht man eine Art Platzhalter bzw. einen Zeiger
mit einen Namen und einem Wert. Ein Funktions- und Variablenname wird so
direkt mit einer physikalischen Adresse assoziiert. Die Organisation aller Symbole
erfolgt in der Symbol Table (vgl. Tabelle 4.1), um ein einfaches Auffinden zu
ermöglichen.
Neben Index, Namen (eigentlich nur als Verweis auf die String Table) und Adresse
des Symbols beinhaltet die Symbol Table in der Spalte info zusätzliche Informa-
tion  diese beschreibt das Binding (d.h. die Sichtbarkeit) und die Klassifikation
des Symbols. Das Binding kann entweder local, global oder weak sein. Lokale
Symbole sind außerhalb ihrer Objektdatei nicht sichtbar (ähnlich wie eine loka-
le C-Variable), global definierte Symbole sind hingegen in allen Objektdateien
sichtbar, dürfen also auch nicht in mehreren vorkommen. Schwache Symbole ver-
halten sich im Prinzip ähnlich wie globale, haben aber eine niedrigere Priorität.
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Figure 6.2: Different views of an ELF file
sections are used by compilers, assemblers, and linkers to arrange the file into
several parts. In this anner the executable code is located in the section .text,
all initialized variables in the section .data, and all not initialized variables in
.bss. Additionally, there is a string table which contains all names of sections and
symbols. Another essential section is the symbol table.
A symbol constitutes a kind of pointer with a name and a value. A name of a
function or a variable can be associated with a physical address in this manner.
The management of all symbols is done with the symbol table to allow an easy
way of locating symbols. Besides index, names, and addresses of symbols the
table also contains in the column info additional information about the visibility
of the binding and the classification of symbols. The binding can be defined
as local, global or weak. Local symbols are not visib e outside of the object file
s milar to a local variable. Globally defined symbols are visible in all obj ct files,
i.e. hey must be unique. Weak symbols actually behave like glob ones, but
have lower priority.
Actually an agent in UbiMASS is a relocatable ELF file. This file is transferred
from one agent host to the next in case of a migration. In order to load the
agent, the receiving agent host calls the function elfloader load() which performs
the following steps:
• At first the header is checked to ensure that it is a correct and compatible
ELF file.
• The next section header is designed to get the number and size of the
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according entries. Using the string table the names of all other sections is
determined.
• Now all sections can be parsed. The section .text contains the current
program code of the ELF file. The section .data presents all initialized
data, whereas .bss contains the non initialized data. for the relocation is
stored in both sections .rela.text and .rela.data. Furthermore the symbol
table and the string table are used to set the pointer on all the relevant
sections and to store the section number for dissolving the final addresses.
• Two functions which are ported for the architecture of the sensor board
ESB 430 are used to allocate memory. Sections .data and .bss are stored
in the RAM, whereas section .text gets into the flash memory.
• Using the symbol table next step is to relocate in sections .text, .bss, and
.data. This leads to the integration of the location independent code into
its environment where it can be executed later.
• Finally the completely linked code is written into the allocated space. The
loaded programm can now be started.
This mechanism offers the possibility to integrate easily new agents into the
running agent system UbiMASS which ensures high flexibility and reliability.
6.1.2 Migration Engine
The Migration Engine of the UbiMASS agent middleware is responsible for com-
plete and correct process of the agent migration. One of the key features is that
the agent can decide on its own which current values of variables it needs to take
to the destination host. In this manner, the agent can trigger an entry point in
order to continue to work where it stopped at the previous host.
The process of the migration is shown in Figure 6.3 and described as follows:
1. Before starting the migration the agent can send current values of integer
and string variables to the agent middleware using two functions set init-
data(int id, int data) and set init data(int id, char data[]). Because the
agent itself will receive this list of tuples, there are no further specifications
necessary. The agent knows how to handle the data on the destination
node.
2. Using start migration() the agent initiates migration and lets the middle-
ware to perform the required steps.
3. Agent middleware initiates the migration. Actually, it is a weak migration,
because only the program code and data of the agent is transferred, but not
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Agent Middleware
Migration Engine
Agent Host 1
Agent
 set_init_data(id, data)
 start_migration()
Agent Middleware
Migration Engine
Agent Host 2
Agent
 MIGRATION
 demand_init_data()
 get_init_data(id)
 send_init()
 send_data()
Figure 6.3: Agent migration in UbiMASS
its status. The agent starts from the beginning at each time. The agent
and its memory address that is known from the initial loading is forwarded
to the communication level. On the destination host, the agent is loaded
and started using the ELF loader described in the previous section.
4. In order to receive the last values of its variables the agent calls at the begin-
ning the middleware function demand init data(). This turns the migration
into a strong migration, because the agent can now continue to work with
its previous status.
5. The destination host requests the list of variables by sending an INIT to
the source host.
6. The source host packs all tuples into a char array and sends it to the
requesting host. Figure 6.4 gives an example of the char array.
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2. Mit start_migration() initiiert der Agent nun die Migration und lässt den
weiteren Ablauf von der Middleware durchführen.
3. Die Agenten-Middleware beginnt nun mit der Agenten-Migration. Im Prin-
zip handelt es sich hierbei immer um eine schwache Migration, d.h. nur
der Programmcode und die Daten des Agenten werden übertragen, nicht
aber sein Zustand  die Ausführung soll also beim Zielhost von Anfang an
starten. Zur Übertragung wird der Agent, dessen Adresse im Speicher ja
vom Laden noch bekannt ist, an die Kommunikationsschicht übergeben. In
kleine Pakete aufgeteilt startet nun der Broadcast-Transfer zum Zielrech-
ner (Agentenhost 2), um dort wieder zusammengesetzt zu werden. Nach
der Ankunft wird die Lademethode des ELF-Loaders aufgerufen (wie in
Abschnitt 4.1.1 beschrieben) und die Ausführung des Agenten startet.
4. Zur Anforderung der Variablenbelegungen ruft der Agent auf Agenten-
host 2 gleich zu Beginn die Methode demand_init_data() der Agenten-
Middleware auf. D mit wird auch gekennz ichnet, ass es sich nicht um
eine schwache Migr i n handelt, sondern dass der Zustand durch die Va-
riablenbelegung übergeben werden soll.
5. Das Agentensystem des Zielrechners fordert nun über die Funknachricht
INIT den Age tenhost 1 dazu auf, die Variablenbeleg ngen zu versenden.
6. Nach erfolgreichem Erhalt der INIT -Nachricht verpackt Agentenhost 1 die
Belegung der Variablen in einem Char-Array, um dieses dann an den Ziel-
rechner zu senden. Die Systematik ist anhand eines Beispiels (Tabelle 4.3)
recht einfach zu erklären:
i 32 3 s 4 t e s t ...
Tabelle 4.3: Senden der Variablenbelegung bei einer Migration
Die erste Stelle gibt immer den Typ (i für Integer, s für String) der Variable
an. Falls es sich um einen Integer handelt, wie am Anfang des Beispiels, so
folgt in den nächsten beiden Feldern der Wert. Da ein Integer zum Speichern
16 Bit benötigt, der Char-Array aber nur 8 Bit pro Feld speichern kann, ist
eine Zerlegung nötig. Die vorderen 8 Bit des Integers werden nach rechts
geshiftet und separat gespeichert. Für den Wert im Beispiel ergibt sich also
(3  8) + 32 = 768 + 32 = 800. Gleich darauf folgt die nächste Variable,
hier vom Typ String. Dabei wird nach der Typbeschreibung ein Feld für
die Angabe der String-Länge verwendet (im Beispiel: Länge 4). Diese Zahl
an Felder wird nun durchlaufen und die gefundenen Char-Werte zu einem
String konkateniert. In der derzeitigen Version von UbiMASS ist die String-
Länge allerdings auf 255 Zeichen beschränkt.
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Figure 6.4: Example: sending of variable values
At the beginning of each variable the type is specified by an i for integer
and s for a string. Because integer variables require 16 bits two chars are
used to deliver one integer right-shifting the first bits by 8. The value in the
example can be calculated by (3 << 8) + 32 = 768 + 32 = 800. After the
string type, length of the st ing is indicated. After successful transfer of the
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message, agent host can delete the agent process and deallocate memory
space or agent can remain, if cloning of agents is desired.
7. After waiting for the variable value to receive the agent can access values
using middleware functions get init data(int id) and get init string(int id).
Because the agent knows in which order it has put the variables, it also
knows which variable matches its id.
The Migration Engine works as a fundamental component of the overall agent
system. For this work our goal was to develop and to evaluate the basic func-
tionality.
6.1.3 Sensor-Actuator Interface
Ubiquitous systems use context information to adapt to environmental changes.
These changes can be detected using sensors. UbiMASS provides a sensor-ac-
tuator interface that is used by the agent system to access sensor and actuator
information from the hardware. The access is strongly dependent on the used
sensor board and its firmware. In the current version of UbiMASS the sensor-
actuator interface is ported to the ESB430 sensor board [Sca07] that has multiple
sensors and actuators on-board. Figure 6.5 gives an overview of current compo-
nents of the UbiMASS interface. Porting to other devices is possible because
4.1 UbiMASS-Architektur
Nach erfolgreichem Versand der Nachricht wird der Agent auf Agenten-
host 1 beendet, alle verbundenen Prozesse getötet und der Speicherbereich
wieder freigegeben.
7. Nach einer kurzen Wartezeit kann der Agent auf dem Zielhost mit den bei-
den Methoden get_init_data(int id) und get_init_string(int id) auf die
Werte der Variablen zugreifen und diese beliebig in sein Programm inte-
grieren. Wie bereits unter Punk 1 erwähnt, bedarf es keiner zusätzlichen
Spezifizierung, da der Agent ja selbst für das Setzen der Variablen zustän-
dig ist und ihm ohnehin bekannt ist, w lch Variable sich hinter welcher id
verbirgt.
Die Migration-Engine arbeitet somit als fundamentale Komponente des gesamten
Agentensystems. I der vorliegenden Arbeit liegt der Schwerpunkt zunächst auf
der Schaffung der grundsätzlichen Funktionalitäten. Zusätzliche Erweiterungen
wie eine zielgerichtete Migration statt einem Broadcast-Transfer oder die Ergän-
zung weiterer Variablentypen zur Übergabe der Belegung sind natürlich durchaus
denkbar und werden auch in Abschnitt 4.3 etwas näher erläutert.
4.1.3 Sensor-Actuator-Interface
Spricht man von ubiqu ären Systemen, so ist stets die Kontextsensi ivität ein
Begriff, der besondere Wichtigkeit mit sich bringt. Die Auswertung von Informa-
tionen über die Umgebung eines Benutzers oder Systems sowie die Anpassung
und Reaktion der Anwendung an Umgebungseinflüsse kann nur erfolgen, wenn
ein Zugriff au Sensordaten zu V rfügu ges ellt wird.
Abbildung 4.4: Zugriff auf Sensoren und Aktoren des ESB 430 in UbiMASS
Das Sensor-Actuator-Interface hat hier zum Ziel, eine einfache Vermittlerrolle
zwischen den Sensor- bzw. Aktuatorgeräten der Hardware und dem Agenten-
system einzunehmen. Der Zugriff auf die Geräte ist natürlich von Sensorboard
zu Sensorboard verschieden, deshalb sollte die eigentliche Implementierung der
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Figure 6.5: Access of sensor and actuators of the ESB430 in UbiMASS
of the modular concept of UbiMASS. It is only necessary to link the firmware
components to the sensor-actuator interface of the new hardware.
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6.1.4 Communication Layer
The agent middleware in UbiMASS is positioned on top of the communication
layer that is responsible for the transfer of messages between sensor nodes. The
communication bases on the User Datagram Protocol (UDP) a minimal and con-
nectionless net-protocol. During the migration process an agent is fragmented
into small packets. Each data packet has a size of 96 bytes and gets an additional
header of 8 bytes. The UDP header contains four 16 bit fields as shown in Figure
6.6:
• ID field identifies the current agent. It is set randomly at the beginning
and is incremented for each new agent.
• The type can get two possible values: a usual data packet has the type
TYPE DATA, whereas a response packet that indicates a packet loss has
the type TYPE NACK.
• Address field is used to reassemble the agent. The address of first packet
gets the value of memory address the agent on the source was stored on.
Each succeeding packet increases the value by the data length (96 Bytes).
Destination host can use this information to reassemble packets in the right
order.
• Length field shows the overall length of the sent data. This is used to check
completeness of the entire data.
ID Type
Address Length
Data
Figure 6.6: UDP datagram format in UbiMASS
Since UDP is a connectionless and non-reliable transfer protocol, there are no
guarantees that a sent packet reaches the receiver or that packets arrive in a
sorted order. The communication layer of UbiMASS closes this gap by checking
the address and ID fields in the packet header. If there are missing or incorrect
packets, UbiMASS requests them by sending a NACK message that contains the
address of incorrect packet. UbiMASS ensures in this way a reliable communica-
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tion between sensor nodes.
6.1.5 UbiMASS Agent
The core of an agent system is the agent itself. Agents in UbiMASS can be
easily implemented using the common C language. Figure 6.7 illustrates an
example of a UbiMASS agent. This agent has the simple task of activating the
1 #include "ubimass-esb.h"
2 #include "migration/migration-tmp.h"
3 #include <stdio.h>
4 #include <stdlib.h>
5 static struct etimer timer;
6 int i = 0;
7 int count_beeps = 2;
8
9 demand_init_data();
10 etimer_set(&timer, CLOCK_SECOND*4);
11 if (init_ok() == 1) {
12 count_beeps = get_init_data(0);
13 }
14 count_beeps++;
15 set_init_data(0, count_beeps);
16
17 while(i < count_beeps) {
18 etimer_reset(&timer);
19 beep_long(CLOCK_SECOND/4);
20 i++;
21 }
22
23 int len = migration_getLen();
24 start_migration(len);
25 }
Figure 6.7: Example of a UbiMASS agent
beeper on the current sensor board. The count of beeps is increased with each
migration. Therefore, the agent uses variable count beeps. After arriving on the
current node agent has to request variable values from the previous node. This
is shown on line 9 of the code, where the agent calls the middleware function
demand init data(). After a waiting time in which the agent host requests
variable values from the source host, the agent can check the status by calling
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init ok(). If variables are received correctly, the agent can access values over the
function get init data(id). After increasing the number of beeps, agent stores
a new value by calling set init data(id, value) in order to be able to access
the variable on the next node. The migration begins after calling the function
start migration().
6.2 Evaluation
We have evaluated UbiMASS in several scenarios using real sensor boards. In
order to illustrate the advantage of UbiMASS compared to traditional over the
air reprogramming, we chose a scenario where the sensor nodes were attached in
the way that the entire network forms a ring. It is assumed that in the middle of
the ring there is an object (e.g. a mountain) that blocks the wireless connectivity,
so that each node has only a single predecessor and successor.
In order to demonstrate reprogramming of the sensor network, the agent that
has the simple task to count the number of sensor nodes is started first. The
agent hops from node to node and increases the number of visited hosts. Since
the network forms a ring, the agent will finally arrive at the first node where it
displays the number of nodes on a connected PC. The round trip traverse of this
agent is shown in Figure 6.8.
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sichergestellt werden, dass die Migration nicht in umgekehrter Richtung läuft.
Dies kann durch eine einfache Modifikation erreicht werden, indem der jeweilige
Agenten-Host nach einer Migration für wenige Sekunden nicht erneut als Ziel-
Host agieren darf. Nun ist lediglich noch darauf zu achten, dass am Anfang keine
direkte Migration von A nach H stattfindet.
Zunächst soll ein Agent durch das Agentensystem geschickt werden, der die An-
zahl der verfügbaren Agenten-Hosts zählt. Nach jeder Migration wird einfach ein
Counter um den Wert 1 erhöht und eine neue Migration gestartet, bei welcher
der aktuelle Counterstand als Variablenwert übergeben wird. Sobald der Agent
wieder Agentenplattform A err icht hat, wird der Wert vom ang schlossenen PC
ausgelesen. Der korrekte Ablauf dieses Beispiels ist in Abbildung 4.8 schematisch
dargestellt.
Abbildung 4.8: Rundlauf eines Beispielagenten in UbiMASS
Angenommen, man möchte gleich im Anschluss einen weiteren Agenten starten,
der ebenso alle Knoten des Sensornetzes durchläuft. Aufgabe des Agenten soll
es sein, die Wetterlage zu beobachten  dies kann in einem einfachen Fall über
den Lichtsensor erfolgen. Der Agent migriert von Host zu Host und testet die
Lichtintensität. Bei der Migration soll dabei immer das Minimum des aktuel-
len Wertes und der bereits erhaltenen Variablenbelegung übergeben werden. So
wird am Ende der kleinste Beleuchtungswert im gesamten Sensornetz als Ergeb-
nis geliefert, um damit beispielsweise festzustellen, ob sich gerade irgendwo ein
Gewitter befindet.
Ein großer Vorteil beim Einsatz von UbiMASS ist in diesem Zusammenhang, dass
der zweite Beispielagent zur Wettermessung bereits unmittelbar im Anschluss ge-
startet werden kann  selbst wenn sich der erste Agent noch innerhalb des draht-
losen Sensornetzes befindet und den Ziel-Host noch nicht erreicht hat. Abbildung
4.9 veranschaulicht die unabhängige Aktivität der beiden Agenten näher.
Dank der besonderen Eigenschaften des Agentensystems ist ein völlig asynchrones
und autonomes Handeln der Agenten möglich. Es müssen außer der Migration
keine Nachrichten zwischen Agenten-Plattformen ausgetauscht werden, da der
Agent alle nötigen Variablenbelegungen mit sich trägt und somit eine zusätzliche
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Figure 6.8: Round trip of a mobile agent in UbiMASS
Since we want to demonstrate the service switch, we start a second agent that
accesses the light sensor on each node (e.g. to check the weather situation). A
great advantage of UbiMASS in this context is that the second agent can be
started ith a short delay after the first agent. In this way, the agents provide
different sensor information without losing much time. Figure 6.9 visualizes this
specific scenario. UbiMASS offers agents the possibility to work asynchronously
and autonomously. Since the agent carries all the information a d sensor values,
there is no need for additional communication except for the migration. After
migration of the agent, the sensor node can perform different services by allowing
other agents to run on it. It is interesting to compare this feature with other
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4.2 Einsatz von UbiMASS anhand eines Anwendungsszenarios
Abbildung 4.9: Rundlauf von zwei Beispielagenten in UbiMASS
Kommunikation überflüssig macht. Sobald der Agent an einem bestimmten Ort
seine Arbeit erfüllt hat und migriert, ist der Sensorknoten wieder völlig unabhän-
gig und kann eine beliebige neue Aufgabe übernehmen.
Interessant ist nun ein Vergleich zum Open-Source-Betriebssystem Contiki, das
in Abschnitt 3.2 näher vorgestellt wurde. Die Frage ist, wie bzw. mit welchem
Aufwand sich dasselbe Anwendungsszenario realisieren ließe. Contiki stellt für das
dynamische Reprogrammieren im Sensornetz eine spezielle Applikation code pro-
pagation and storage zur Verfügung. Damit ist es möglich, Programmcode über
eine Kabelverbindung auf dem Sensorknoten zu empfangen und zu laden. Au-
ßerdem wird nach dem Empfang automatisch ein Broadcast-Versand über Funk
initiiert, welcher den Code an alle Sensorknoten in Reichweite transferiert. Pro-
blematisch ist bei der Versuchsanordnung von Abbildung 4.7, dass ja nach Vor-
aussetzung immer nur ein Sensorboard über Funk von jeweils einem anderem
Board erreichbar ist. Wird der Code nun vom PC auf Sensorknoten A übertra-
gen, so findet zwar ein Funktransfer zu Knoten B statt, danach stoppt aber der
Algorithmus. Es ist deshalb nötig, zu jedem zweiten Knoten eine Kabelverbin-
dung aufzubauen, da immer nur eine einzige Weiterleitung des Programmcodes
über Funk erfolgt.
Um wiederum eine Anwendung zu schaffen, die einfach die Anzahl der Knoten im
Sensornetz zählt und diese Zahl als Rückgabewert liefert, ist bei Contiki deutlich
mehr Aufwand notwendig. Es muss auf alle Knoten Code transferiert und geladen
werden, der dann eine nachrichtenbasierte Kommunikation zwischen den einzel-
nen Knoten ermöglicht. Zur besseren Orientierung wird der zweigeteilte Ablauf
in Abbildung 4.10 etwas näher skizziert. Es ist offensichtlich, dass dieses Vorge-
hen viel mehr Zeit kostet: Es muss zunächst gewartet werden, bis wirklich alle
49
Figure 6.9: Round trip of two successive mobile agents in UbiMASS
4 UbiMASS  ein mobiles Agentensystem für Sensornetze
Abbildung 4.10: Realisierung eines Rundlaufs mit Contiki
Knoten des Sensornetzes mit dem korrekten Programmcode beliefert wurden 
erst danach kann die eigentliche Anwendung starten. Dabei wird der Reihe nach
eine Nachricht mit einer Variablen versandt, die bei jeder Ankunft um den Wert
1 erhöht wird. Sobald die Nachricht wieder den Ausgangspunkt erreicht hat, kann
der Wert der Variablen vom angeschlossenen Rechner ausgelesen werden.
Da die Sensorboards auch vom Zustand der anderen Boards abhängig sind, ist
ein autonomes und asynchrones Arbeiten wie in UbiMASS nicht möglich. Ein
etwaiges zweites Programm kann nicht früher installiert werden, ehe die Berech-
nung und interne Kommunikation des ersten vollständig abgeschlossen ist. Um
das Szenario von Abbildung 4.9 zu realisieren, d.h. zwei Agenten nacheinander
auszuführen, wären doppelt so viele Schritte nötig als in Abbildung 4.10. Der
zweite Agent könnte erst nach dem vollständig beendeten Durchlauf des ersten
auf die Boards übertragen werden und seine Ausführung starten.
Als Fazit lässt sich feststellen, dass das Agentensystem UbiMASS für derartige
Anwendungsszenarien deutlich mehr Flexibilität und Effizienz bietet. Durch die
starke Migration, in welcher der Agent die Variablenbelegungen mit sich trägt, ist
eine weitere nachrichtenbasierte Kommunikation unnötig. Dies macht sich nicht
zuletzt in der Laufzeit der gesamten Applikation bemerkbar, was ein sehr wich-
tiger Faktor bei der Entwicklung sowie beim Einsatz eines Systems ist.
Im Rahmen der Evaluierung in Kapitel 5 wird das Anwendungsszenario und die
verschiedenen Rundläufe später nochmals aufgegriffen und mit Messergebnissen
und praktischen Beobachtungen in Verbindung gebracht.
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Figure 6.10: Round trip in Contiki
reprogramming systems. To investigate this, we implemented the same scenario
with two successive agents as mentioned above on the open source operating
system Contiki. With the specific application of code propagation and storage of
Contiki it is possible to reprogra ensor nodes. After loading a program from
a PC on a sensor node this program can be transfe red to n ighboring nodes by
broadcasting the code. But this is limited to only one time, i.e. nodes that are
reachable over two or more hops cannot be programmed with this approach. In
our ring scenario, this leads to an enormous effort since we have to attach a PC
at each second sen or node. After this work, it is nece s ry to send a round-trip
message in order to receive the sensor values. Loading a second service requires
the same effort a ain from the beginning. Figure 6.10 descri es he requir d steps
in Contiki compared to round trip of a single ge t in UbiMASS (see Figure 6.8).
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Figure 6.11: Receiving an agent: only transfer time vs loading time
In order to evaluate the transfer time and loading time of agents, we measured the
communication between two neighboring nodes. Transfer time is only the time
to send the packets from one node to another without considering the dynamic
loading time of the agent. Loading time contains also the time for starting the
agent on the destination node. Figure 6.11 shows a chart where the size of the
agent is increased and the respective time is measured in system ticks (since
the timer functions of the firmware provide system ticks). As expected the time
increases linearly according to the size of the agent. Also the loading time is linear
because the ELF loader has to handle more code if the agent size increases.
It is also interesting to compare the loading time of UbiMASS to on the air
programming of Contiki. Figure 6.12 visualizes the results of this comparison.
The chart clearly shows that the communication layer of UbiMASS works more
efficiently. UbiMASS takes much less time to load the new service. Increasing
the size of the code also increases the distance between both lines.
For the next scenario we implemented an agent that migrated to another node and
back. We measured the round trip time in system ticks. It was also interesting
to investigate the communication in relation to the distance between nodes. We
performed several measurements by changing the location of the nodes. Figure
6.13 shows that increasing the distance leads to more packet losses which results in
higher transfer times. Also obstacles like persons or walls and other interferences
highly affect the communication time.
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Figure 6.12: Receiving an agent: comparison with reprogramming in Contiki
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Figure 6.13: Round trip time subject to distance between sensor nodes

7 Security Architecture for WSN
Wireless sensor networks are highly vulnerable to attacks because they consist
of numerous resource-constrained devices and communicate via wireless links.
These vulnerabilities are exacerbated when WSNs have to operate unattended
in a hostile environment such as battlefields. In such an environment, an adver-
sary poses a physical threat to all the sensor nodes. An adversary may capture
any node, compromising critical security data. Consequently, it is necessary to
provide security services to these networks to ensure their survival. In general,
there are two different terms typically used to express the vulnerabilities in se-
curity: threats and attacks. Threat is a potential for violation of security, which
exists when there is a circumstance, capability, action, or event that could breach
security and cause harm, i.e. a threat is a possible danger that might exploit
vulnerability. Attack is an assault on system security that derives from an intel-
ligent threat, i.e. an intelligent act that is a deliberate attempt (especially in the
sense of a method or technique) to evade security services and violate the security
policy of a system. Or in other words, a security threat is the expressed potential
for the occurrence of an attack, while a security attack is an action taken against
a target with the intention of doing harm.
7.1 Security Requirements in WSN
Sensor networks are used in a number of domains that handle sensitive infor-
mation. Due to this, there are many considerations that should be investigated
and are related with protecting sensitive information transferred between nodes
(which are either sensor nodes or the base station) from been disclosed to unau-
thorized third parties. The comprehensive security requirements can be classified
as follows:[RY06], [CKM00]
• Confidentiality: Confidentiality requirement is needed to ensure that sen-
sitive information is well protected and not revealed to unauthorized third
parties. The confidentiality objective is required in sensors environment to
protect information traveling between the sensor nodes of the network or
between the sensors and the base station from disclosure, since an adversary
having the appropriate equipment may eavesdrop on the communication.
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Compromised nodes are a big threat to confidentiality since the adversary
could steal critical data stored on nodes such as cryptographic keys used to
encrypt messages.
• Authentication: As in conventional systems, authentication techniques
verify the identity of the participants in a communication, distinguishing in
this way legitimate users from intruders. In the case of WSN, it is essential
for each sensor node and base station to have the ability to verify that the
data received was really send by a trusted sender and not by an adversary
that tricked legitimate nodes into accepting false data. If such a case hap-
pens and false data are supplied into the network, then the behavior of the
network could not be predicted and probably will not outcome as expected.
Authentication objective is essential to be achieved when clustering of nodes
is performed. Clustering involves grouping nodes based on some attribute
such as their location, sensing data, etc. Each cluster usually has a cluster
head (CH) that is the node that joins its cluster with the rest of the WSN
(meaning that the communication among different clusters is performed
through CHs). In these cases, where clustering is required, two authentica-
tion situations should be regarded; first it is critical to ensure that the nodes
belonging to each cluster will exchange data only with the authorized nodes
and which are trusted based on some authentication protocol. Otherwise,
if nodes within a cluster receive and process data from nodes that are not
trusted within the current community, the expected data would be falsified
and may cause damage. The second authentication situation involves the
communication between CHs of each cluster. Communication must be es-
tablished only with CHs that can prove their identity. No malicious node
should be able to masquerade as a CH and communicate with a legitimate
CH, sending it false data or either compromising exchanged data.
• Integrity: Integrity objective means the danger that information could
be altered when exchanged over insecure networks. Lack of integrity could
result in many problems since the consequences of using inaccurate infor-
mation could be disastrous, for example for the health care sector where
lives are endangered. Integrity controls must be implemented to ensure that
information will not be altered in any unexpected way. Many sensor appli-
cations such as pollution and health care monitoring rely on the integrity
of the information to function with accurate outcomes; it is unacceptable
to measure the magnitude of the pollution caused by chemicals waste and
find out later on that the information provided was improperly altered by
the factory that was located near by the monitored lake. Therefore, there
is urgent need to make sure that information is traveling from end to end
without being intercepted and modified in the process.
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• Data Freshness: One of the many attacks launched against WSN is the
message replay attack where an adversary may capture messages exchanged
between nodes and replay them later to cause confusion to the network.
Data freshness objective ensures that messages are fresh, meaning that they
obey in a message ordering and have not been reused. To achieve freshness,
network protocols must be designed in a way to identify duplicate packets
and discard them preventing potential mix-up.
• Secure Management: Management is required in every system that is
constituted from multi components and handles sensitive information. In
the case of WSN, secure management on base station level is needed. Since
sensor node communication ends up at the base station, issues like key
distribution to sensor nodes in order to establish encryption and routing
information need secure management. Furthermore, clustering requires se-
cure management as well, since each group of nodes may include a large
number of nodes that need to be authenticated with each other and ex-
change data in a secure manner. In addition, clustering in each sensor
network can change dynamically and rapidly. Therefore, secure protocols
for group management are required for adding and removing members, and
authenticating data from groups of nodes.
• Availability: Availability ensures that services and information can be
accessed at the time that they are required. In WSN, there are many risks
that could result in loss of availability such as sensor node capturing and
denial of service attacks. Lack of availability may affect the operation of
many critical real time applications like those in the health care sector that
require a 24 / 7 operation that could even result in the loss of life. There-
fore, it is critical to ensure resilience to attacks targeting the availability
of the system and find ways to fill in the gap created by the capturing or
disablement of a specific node by assigning its duties to some other nodes
in the network.
• Quality of Service: Quality of Service (QoS) objective is a big headache
to security. With all the limitations in WSN, QoS becomes even more
constrained. Security mechanisms must be lightweight so that the overhead
caused for example by encryption must be minimized and should not affect
the performance of the network. Performance and quality in WSN involve
the timely delivery of data to prevent for example propagation of pollution
and the accuracy with which the data reported match what is actually
occurring in their environment.
• Robustness: When some sensor nodes are compromised, the entire net-
work should not also become compromised. The quantitative value with
which this requirement should be satisfied depends on the application.
70 Security Architecture for WSN
7.2 Security Threats in WSN
The possible security threats in WSNs are identified as follows [UAJP02]:
• Passive Information Gathering: An adversary with powerful resources
collecting information from WSNs if information is not encrypted.
• Node Subversion: Capture of a node may reveal its information including
disclosure of cryptographic keys, hence compromising the whole WSN.
• False Node: Addition of a malicious node by an adversary to inject mali-
cious data. False node would be computationally robust to lure other nodes
to send data to it.
• Node Malfunction: A malfunctioning node will generate inaccurate data
that would jeopardize the integrity of a WSN, especially when that node is
a data-aggregating node, for example, a cluster-head.
• Node Outage: What happens when a cluster-head stops functioning?
WSN protocols should be robust enough to mitigate the effects of node
outages by providing an alternate route.
• Message Corruption: When contents of a message are modified by an
attacker, it compromises the message integrity.
• Traffic Analysis: Even if the message transfer is encrypted in WSNs, it
still leaves the high probability of analysis of communication patterns and
sensor activities revealing enough information to enable an adversary to
cause more malicious harm to the WSN.
7.3 Security Attacks in WSN
In general, network security attacks are typically classified into passive and active
attacks. In passive attacks, an unauthorized party gains access to an asset with-
out modifying its content or actively attacking or disrupting a network. Passive
attacks are very difficult to detect because they do not involve any alteration of
the data, thus it is feasible to prevent the success of these attacks, usually by
means of encryption. Thus, the emphasis in dealing with passive attacks is on
prevention rather than detection. In active attacks, an unauthorized party makes
modifications to a message, data stream, or file. It is possible to detect this type
of attack, but it may not be preventable. There are two aspects of security at-
tacks in WSN: layering based security attacks, and routing mechanisms attacks
as shown in the next two subsections.
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7.3.1 Layering-Based Security Attacks in WSN
7.3.1.1 Application Layer Attacks
Data is collected and managed at application layer. Therefore, it is important to
ensure the reliability of data. A resilient aggregation scheme that is applicable to
a cluster-based network, where a cluster leader acts as an aggregator in WSN has
been presented in [Wag04]. However, this technique is applicable, if the aggre-
gating node is in the range with all the source nodes and there is no intervening
node between the aggregator and source nodes. In the hierarchical clustering
approach, a communication channel between the aggregator and base station has
potentially limited bandwidth because the cluster leader as an aggregator itself is
a sensor node [Wag04], [LH05]. To prove the validity of the aggregation, cluster
leaders use cryptographic techniques to ensure data reliability.
7.3.1.2 Transport Layer Attacks
The transport layer is responsible for managing end-to-end connections. Two
possible attacks are possible in this layer: flooding and desynchronization.
• Flooding: Whenever a protocol is required to maintain state at either
end of a connection, it becomes vulnerable to memory exhaustion through
flooding [WS02]. An attacker may repeatedly make new connection requests
until the resources required by each connection are exhausted or reach a
maximum limit. In either case, further legitimate requests will be ignored.
One proposed solution to this problem is to require that each connecting
client demonstrate its commitment to the connection by solving a puzzle
[WS02]. The idea is that a connecting client will not needlessly waste its
resources creating unnecessary connections. Given that an attacker does
not likely have infinite resources, it will be impossible for him/her to create
new connections fast enough to cause resource starvation on the serving
node. While these puzzles do include processing overhead, this technique
is more desirable than excessive communication.
• Desynchronization: Desynchronization refers to the disruption of an ex-
isting connection [WS02]. An attacker may for example repeatedly spoof
messages to an end host, causing that host to request the retransmission
of missed frames. If timed correctly, an attacker may degrade or even pre-
vent the ability of the end hosts to successfully exchange data, thus causing
them to waste energy by attempting to recover from errors which never
really existed. A possible solution to this type of attack is to require au-
thentication of all packets communicated between hosts. Provided that the
authentication method is itself secure, an attacker will be unable to send
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the spoofed messages to the end hosts.
7.3.1.3 Network Layer Attacks
The network layer is responsible for routing of messages from node to node, node
to CH, CH to other CHs, CHs to the base station, and vice versa. Routing
protocols in WSN are based on two types of techniques: (1) ID-based protocols,
in which packets are routed to the destination based on the IDs specified in
the packets, and (2) data-centric protocols [GACE04] in which packets contain
attributes that specify the type of data being provided. The attacks in the
network and the routing layer are described in the following [KW03]:
• Routing Loops or Spoofed/Fake Routing Information: In WSN,
routing loops attack the information exchanged between nodes. False error
messages are generated when an attacker alters and replays the routing in-
formation. Routing loops attract or repel the network traffic and increase
node-to-node latency. A countermeasure against spoofing and alteration is
to append a Message Authentication Code (MAC) after the message. By
adding a MAC to the message, the receivers can verify whether the mes-
sages have been spoofed or altered. To defend against replayed information,
counters or timestamps can be included in the messages [HPJ03].
• Selective Forwarding: Selective forwarding is a way to influence the net-
work traffic by believing that all the participating nodes in network are
reliable to forward the message. In selective forwarding attack, malicious
nodes simply drop certain messages instead of forwarding every message.
Once a malicious node cherry picks on the messages, it reduces the latency
and deceives the neighboring nodes that they are on a shorter route. Ef-
fectiveness of this attack depends on two factors. First is the location of
the malicious node. The closer it is to the base station, the more traffic it
will attract. Second is the percentage of messages it drops. When a selec-
tive forwarder drops more messages and forwards less, it retains its energy
level, thus remaining powerful to trick the neighboring nodes. One defense
against selective forwarding attacks is using multiple paths to send data. A
second defense is to detect the malicious node or assume it has failed and
seek an alternative route [HPJ03].
• Sinkhole Attack: In sinkhole attacks, an adversary attracts the traffic to
a compromised node. The simplest way of creating a sinkhole is to place
a malicious node where it can attract most of the traffic, possibly closer to
the base station or malicious node itself, which deceptively acts as a base
station. One reason for sinkhole attacks is to make selective forwarding
possible to attract the traffic toward a compromised node. The nature of
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WSNs where all the traffic flows toward one base station makes this type
of attack more susceptible.
• Sybil Attack: This is a type of attack where a node creates multiple ille-
gitimate identities in WSNs either by fabricating or stealing the identities
of legitimate nodes [JNSP04]. Sybil attacks can be used against routing
algorithms and topology maintenance; it reduces the effectiveness of fault-
tolerant schemes such as distributed storage and disparity. Another mali-
cious factor is geographic routing where a Sybil node can appear at more
than one place simultaneously.
• Wormholes: In wormhole attacks, an adversary positioned closer to the
base station can completely disrupt the traffic by tunneling messages over
a low- latency link [MNP04]. Here an adversary convinces the nodes which
are multihop away that they are closer to the base station. This creates a
sinkhole because an adversary on the other side of the sinkhole provides a
better route to the base station.
• Hello Flood Attack: This involves broadcasting a message with stronger
transmission power and pretending that the HELLO message is coming
from the base station [HMH06]. Message receiving nodes assume that the
HELLO message sending node is the closest one and they try to send all
their messages through this node. In this type of attack, all nodes will
be responding to HELLO floods and wasting the energies. The real base
station will also be broadcasting the similar messages but will have only a
few nodes responding to it.
• Acknowledgment Spoofing: Routing algorithms used in WSNs some-
times require Acknowledgments (ACK) to be used. An attacking node can
spoof the ACK of overheard packets destined for neighboring nodes in or-
der to provide false information to those neighboring nodes. An example
of such false information is claiming that a node is alive when in fact it is
dead.
7.3.1.4 Data Link Layer Attacks
The data link layer ensures reliable point-to-point and point-to-multipoint con-
nections in a communication network. Attacks at the link layer include purposely
introduced collisions, resource exhaustion, and unfairness.
• Collisions: A collision occurs when two nodes attempt to transmit on the
same frequency simultaneously. An adversary may strategically cause col-
lisions in specific packets such as ACK control messages. TinySec [KSW04]
has introduced link layer encryption, which depends on a key manage-
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ment scheme. Protocols like Lightweight Medium Access Control (LMAC)
[HH04] have better properties, which are viable countermeasures at this
layer.
• Exhaustion: Repeated collisions can also be used by an attacker to cause
resource exhaustion. Unless these hopeless retransmissions are discovered or
prevented, the energy reserves of the transmitting node and those surround-
ing it will be quickly depleted. A possible solution is to apply rate limits to
the MAC admission control such that the network can ignore excessive re-
quests, thus preventing the energy drain caused by repeated transmissions.
A second technique is to use time- division multiplexing where each node
is allotted a time slot in which it can transmit.
• Unfairness: Unfairness can be considered a weak form of a Denial of
Services (DoS) attack. Instead of preventing access to a service outright, an
attacker can degrade it in order to gain an advantage such as causing other
nodes in a real- time MAC protocol to miss their transmission deadline.
The use of small frames lessens the effect of such attacks by reducing the
amount of time an attacker can capture the communication channel.
7.3.1.5 Physical Layer Attacks
The physical layer emphasizes the transmission media between sending and re-
ceiving nodes. The data rate, signal strength, and frequency types are also ad-
dressed in this layer. Following two vulnerabilities are explored:
• Jamming: Is a type of attack which interferes with the radio frequencies
that a network’s nodes are using [SP04]. A jamming source may either be
powerful enough to disrupt the entire network or less powerful and only able
to disrupt a smaller portion of the network. Even with lesser-powered jam-
ming sources, such as a small compromised subset of the network’s sensor
nodes, an adversary has the potential to disrupt the entire network provided
the jamming sources are randomly distributed in the network. Ideally, the
Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum (FHSS) is used in sensor networks to
overcome the jamming attack. Code spreading is another technique used
to defend against jamming attacks and is common in mobile networks.
• Tampering: Given physical access to a node, an attacker can extract
sensitive information such as cryptographic keys or other data on the node.
The node may also be altered or replaced to create a compromised node that
the attacker controls. One defense to this attack involves tamper-proofing
the node’s physical package.
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7.3.2 Routing Mechanism Attacks in WSN
Most routing mechanisms designed for WSN assume that nodes in the network
do not misbehave. This provides many opportunities for malicious nodes to at-
tack and disrupt the routing mechanism. These attacks can be classified also as
passive and active attacks. A passive attack typically involves only eavesdrop-
ping the routing traffic, which can be solved either by using encryption or by
transmitting parts of message over multiple disjoint paths and reassemble them
at the destination as mentioned before. Active attacks can be classified into
three classes according to the on time routing process as shown in the following
subsections.
7.3.2.1 Attacks on Route Discovery Process
Such attacks attempt to prevent other legitimate nodes from establishing routing
paths by sending fake routing information. Moreover, a malicious node can send
excessive route request messages to exhaust the network bandwidth. The former
is to provide fake information to spoof the route discovery process, while the
latter is to overly use the route discovery process. Both of them attempt to cause
DoS.
7.3.2.2 Attacks on Route Selection Process
Such attacks attempt to increase the chance that malicious nodes are selected
other legitimate nodes as part of their routes. Four possible of attacks of this
type are involved; Hello flood attacks, sinkhole attacks, wormhole attacks, and
Sybil attacks.
7.3.2.3 Attacks after Establishing Routing Paths
Once a source node establishes a route through a malicious node, the malicious
node can unscrupulously drop the data packets from the source or modify the con-
tents of packets if encryption is not applied. Two attacks are involved, blackhole
attack and spam attack.
• Blackhole Attack: Here, the malicious nodes intentionally drop all re-
ceived messages from the source to prevent these messages from being
propagated to any further. To defend against such attack, routing pro-
tocols should have route maintenance mechanism such that if a node in a
path finds that its next hop neighbor no longer propagates data packets,
it would notify the source to recreate another path. Three mechanisms
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are proposed to defend blackhole attack as follow [AKWK04]. Teh first
approach is the Source Routing, in which the source specifies in each data
packet the sequence of nodes that the packet has to traverse. Second is
the Destination Acknowledgment, in which the destination sends back an
ACK to the source along the same route (but in reverse direction) when
it receives each data packet. Third mechanism is Timeouts, in which the
source and each intermediate node set a timer for each data packet, during
which they expect to receive an ACK from the destination or a Fault An-
nouncement (FA) from other intermediate nodes. When the timer expires
at a node, it generates an FA message and propagates this message back to
the source. All data, ACK, and FA messages are authenticated by a MAC
so that these messages cannot be modified or fabricated by a malicious
node. Note that the source can detect the presence of a potential blackhole
attacker, when it receives an FA message and thus select another route to
forward its packets.
• Spam Attack: These type of attacks are caused by malicious nodes gen-
erating frequent dummy messages to specified targets in the network. A
WSN is more vulnerable to this attack because the sink is usually the only
target to be attacked. To defend against such attack, the Detect And De-
fend Spam (DADS) scheme proposes a concept of quarantine regions to
isolate spam attackers [SCL04]. In DADS the remote sink is responsible for
detecting whether there are spam attacks in the network by observing the
packet generation rate of the overall sensor nodes in network.
7.4 SecSens - A Novel Security Architecture for
Wireless Sensor Networks
Based on the investigated results of last sections, a novel security architecture
for wireless sensor networks, called SecSens, will be introduced in the following
[BUB10] [BUB09]. The sensor network in SecSens consists of clusters, each con-
taining simple sensor nodes ui and one powerful sensor node v that acts as a
cluster-head. Sensor nodes ui are connected directly to the cluster-head, because
routing in clusters is not necessary. Sensor nodes can be a member of several clus-
ters. Cluster-heads again build together an inter-cluster network, that is used to
transfer messages to base stations. It is assumed that sensor nodes have a fixed
position, once they are attached to a location. SecSens works with multiple base
stations to avoid the risk of single-point-of-failure. The security architecture of
SecSens combines several security approaches in order to provide high protection.
Basically SecSens contains four components, which interact with each other: au-
thenticated broadcasts, key management, routing, and en-route filtering.
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7.4.1 Authenticated Broadcasts
Authenticated broadcasts ensure that the stated sender is identified as the true
sender. Symmetric approaches use a shared key to generate a message authenti-
cation code (MAC). In case of only one receiver, the sender is clearly identified.
But if there are multiple receivers with the same shared key, this approach for au-
thentication is not applicable. Potentially each receiver could be the sender. To
solve this problem, there must exist an asymmetry between sender and receiver.
SecSens provides two authenticated broadcasts: broadcasts from base stations,
and broadcasts in clusters. It is assumed that base stations are trustworthy and
can not be infiltrated. In order to generate an asymmetry, SecSens uses key
chains. Each packet contains a key. To decrypt a previous packet, a node has to
wait for the key of next packet. (Figure 7.1).
t
Figure 7.1: Key chain approach
The base station generates a key chain Kb0 . . . K
b
n with sufficient number of keys
using a publicly known one-way function F , so that for i ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1} is:
Kbi = F (K
b
i+1) (7.1)
Each node knows that the first key in the chain is
〈
i,Kbi
〉
with i = 0. Therefore,
Kb0 is public and K
b
1 is the first non-disclosed key. Keys can be used only once.
In order to broadcast a message M , the base station calculates the corresponding
MAC using the next non-disclosed key Kbi and sends it together with used key
index to all its neighbors:
BS → ∗ : i,MACKbi (M) (7.2)
A receiving node u checks, if it has already received a MAC for the stated index,
before storing the MAC and index i into the MAC buffer. Consequently node
u accepts only one MAC per key index. If i is a new index and u is a cluster-
head, it forwards the message to all its neighbors. In this way, it is efficiently
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distributed over the inter-cluster network to all sensor nodes. After maximum
time T all sensor nodes know the MAC together with its key index. Sensor nodes
can not manipulate the MAC, because the base station has not yet disclosed
Kbi at this time. Time Tp describes a dynamically adaptable system parameter.
The base station can set Tp depending on the network size, whereas T < Tp.
After expiration of Tp, the base station sends the actual message M besides the
disclosed key data
〈
i,Kbi
〉
to all neighbors:
BS → ∗ : M,
〈
i,Kbi
〉
(7.3)
Sensor node u can now verify Kbi using a previous disclosed key K
b
i−1. If it
does not have Kbi−1, it can verify the current key through recursively performing
Equation 7.1 with previous keys. To prevent DoS-attacks, the new key must not
be older than Gmax generations. If K
b
i is finally verified, node u makes new key
data
〈
i,Kbi
〉
effective. Subsequently, u can check message M using MACKbi (M)
and index i. It is important that the index for MAC and key are the same.
The concept of authenticated broadcasts for base stations has a disadvantage,
if it is used for local authenticated broadcasts between clusters, because of the
delayed disclosure of keys. However, all receivers of a message in a cluster can
be reached after a single hop. This fact can be used to simplify the concept,
in order to avoid time delays. The cluster-head generates a key chain Kb0 . . . K
b
n
using a publicly known function F . All cluster members receive the first key Kb0
over a secure connection using pair-wise shared keys known only by cluster-head
and respective node. Cluster-head v uses for each local authenticated broadcast
a key Kbi , which is not yet disclosed. It sends the message M together with the
key data:
v → ∗ : M,Kbi (7.4)
Cluster nodes can verify Kbi and the message M using previously disclosed keys.
With this the sender is authenticated as cluster-head, because only the cluster-
head can know Kbi , that was not public until current message. On the other
hand, no intermediate node can manipulate the message M , because all potential
receivers of M are reachable with only one hop.
7.4.2 Key Management
Sensor nodes basically distrust each other. To build trust between two or more
nodes, a shared secret in the form of keys is needed. However, neighborhood and
relations between sensor nodes are not known before. Therefore, nodes must build
trust during life-time, more strictly in the initial phase. For security reasons,
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a sensor node should join a network only once. In this critical phase, it can
establish shared keys with its neighbors. Since this procedure is performed only
once, the node is binding itself to the location. Furthermore, sensor nodes can
communicate at several levels, that is cluster- or network-wide. Consequently,
SecSens uses several kinds of keys to fulfill different security requirements.
Activation: In the initial phase, a sensor node needs an initial key KI . This key
is stored only on a specific activation node, which does not take part for usual
networking tasks. The basic idea is that sensor nodes can not install themselves
independently. Instead a trustworthy employee, who owns the activation node,
establishes sensors. In order to add a set of sensor nodes, the base station stores
a randomly generated master key KA, timer TA, initial key KI , and current group
key Kg onto the activation node A. Using master key KA, the base station can
generate for each sensor node u a personal activation key Kau based on the node
ID.
Kau = FKA(u) (7.5)
All key material and other security critical data are stored only in RAM of A. TA
determines period of validity for the master key. After expiration of this time, the
activation node deletes KA and all critical data. Each sensor node u has a unique
ID and a personal activation key Kau. In order to activate sensor node u, the
activation node A has to be in the communication range. For security reasons,
the radio power of A is kept low, to ensure physical proximity. After turning on
for the first time, sensor node u broadcasts periodically its plain ID and the ID
encrypted with the personal key with the same low radio power. Activation node
A can easily verify the ID, because it knows the master key KA. As the next
step, A encrypts with personal key of u the initial key KI , group key K
g, and
data X that was given by base station. Finally, A sends encrypted message to
sensor node u:
u→ A : u,MACKau(u) (7.6)
A→ u : {KI , Kg, X}Kau (7.7)
After receiving all key material, sensor node u is activated and it deletes the
personal activation key.
Group keys: The group key Kg is used by the base station to secure network-
wide communication. An attacker, who compromises a node, can also access
the group key. In order to update Kg, the base station broadcasts first a list
of known compromised nodes {x1, ..., xm} to all sensor nodes. Additionally, it
sends a verification key FKg ′(0), whereas K
g ′ is a new randomly generated group
key, and F a publicly known one-way function. FKg ′(0) is used later to verify the
new group key Kg ′.
BS → ∗ : i,MACKbi ({x1, . . . , xm} ||FKg ′(0)) (7.8)
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BS → ∗ : {x1, . . . , xm} , FKg ′(0),
〈
i,Kbi
〉
(7.9)
The base station uses an authenticated broadcast with key Kbi and index i that is
not disclosed yet. After receiving key Kbi and successfully verifying the above mes-
sage (see section 7.4.1), sensor nodes delete all pair-wise shared keys or cluster-
keys with compromised node xi. Cluster-heads additionally update their cluster-
keys and inform other non-compromised cluster-heads about new cluster-key.
Afterwards, all sensor nodes store verification key FKg ′(0). As a second step, the
base station publishes new group key Kg ′. Therefore, it encrypts the group key
using its cluster-key KcBS and transfers the message to all direct neighbors. The
neighbors can verify Kg ′ using verification key FKg ′(0) and store afterwards the
new group key.
BS → ∗ : {Kg ′}KcBS (7.10)
If receiver u is a cluster-head, it forwards a new group key Kg ′ encrypted by its
own cluster key Kcu. Consequently, the new group key K
g ′ is forwarded over the
inter-cluster network to all sensor nodes. Since cluster-heads have updated their
cluster keys before, the compromised nodes do not receive the new group key.
This procedure is periodically repeated by base stations to prevent the network
against attacks. If there are no new known compromised nodes, the transferred
list is empty.
Pair-wise shared keys: For secure communication between sensor nodes, pair-
wise shared keys are used. A new cluster-head exchanges a pair-wise key with all
neighbors. Simple sensor nodes communicate only over cluster-head, therefore,
they need only a shared key with their cluster-head. Using the initial key KI
each node u generates a personal master key Kpu based on its ID. In order to
establish a pair-wise shared key with its neighbor v, node u needs the ID of v.
For this reason u broadcasts a HELLO-message containing its ID. If v decides to
establish secure connection with new node u, it answers with an acknowledgment
containing its own ID.
u→ ∗ : u (7.11)
v → u : v,MACKpv (u||v) (7.12)
The additional MAC authenticates the acknowledgement of v, because u can
calculate master key Kpv of v using initial key KI . Node u does not need to
authenticate itself, because the succeeding message exchange verifies the identity
of u. The pair-wise shared key Kpuv can be calculated by both nodes without new
message exchange:
Kpuv = FKpv (u) (7.13)
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After expiration of time TI the nodes delete initial key KI and all personal master
keys of their neighbors received during initialization. Only one personal master
key is stored for future pair-wise keys with new sensor nodes. The annulment
of compromised pair-wise keys is efficiently realized by deletion of corresponding
keys.
Cluster keys: Sensor nodes transfer information to all other cluster members
using the cluster key without encrypting the message for each receiver separately.
This approach allows in-network-processing and passive participation of sensor
nodes within a cluster. Cluster-head u generates randomly cluster key Kcu, if u
joins a network or if u updates cluster key because of compromised nodes. Each
cluster member v1, . . . , vm receives new cluster key K
c
u, whereas u encrypts cluster
key using pair-wise shared keys Kpuvi for i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}:
u→ vi : {Kcu}Kpuvi (7.14)
Only sensor node vi can decrypt cluster key and store it. If an additional sensor
node v joins the network, it establishes a new pair-wise shared key with cluster-
head. In this case it also gets the current cluster key. If a cluster member is
compromised, cluster-head annuls cluster key Kcu and distributes new key K
c
u
′ as
described above, without sending it to the compromised nodes.
7.4.3 Routing
To prevent attacks on routing level or restrict them locally, SecSens provides a
secure routing protocol. Simple sensors in SecSens do not need a routing capa-
bility, because they exclusively communicate with the cluster-head. Therefore,
routing is used only within the inter-cluster network built by cluster-heads. The
routing algorithm has two phases: initialization and the actual routing. In the
initialization phase each node gets a level using breadth first search that deter-
mines the distance to base station in hops. Since base station has level 0, its
direct neighbors have level 1. The base station uses an authenticated broadcast
including its ID BSu, a non-disclosed key K
b
i , and key index i to authenticate an
initialization.
BS → ∗ : i,MACKbi (BSu) (7.15)
BS → ∗ : BSu,
〈
i,Kbi
〉
(7.16)
Cluster-heads can identify from authenticated messages, which base station wants
to update routing information. After reception of initialization, cluster-heads
have time T to modify their routing tables. After expiration of T , further changes
are not allowed. Cluster-heads set their level on L = ∞ after reception of the
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message (see Equation 7.16). The breadth first search can now begin. Starting
from the base station, the level values are locally broadcasted by cluster-heads. To
prevent outsider-attacks each cluster-head u uses key Kbi , that will be published
later, and its cluster key Kcu to generate an encrypted message containing ID and
level value Lu:
u→ ∗ : {u||Lu}Kcu , K
b
i (7.17)
A cluster-head v updates its level to Lv = Lu + 1, if Lv > Lu + 1. It also stores
level of u. After level update, v forwards its level value to its neighbors in the
same way. Each base station triggers its own initialization without disturbing
ongoing updates of others. The cluster-heads manage a routing table for each
base station.
SecSens uses probabilistic multi-path routing based on the level values to for-
ward messages from cluster-heads on the way to the corresponding base station.
Cluster-heads build up a trust matrix, where each transmission to its neighbors is
recorded. Based on this trust information and current level, cluster-heads calcu-
late a probability value and write it into the packet header. This value is used to
decide in which direction the packet has to be send. Each cluster-head modifies
the probability value and sends the message over the most trustworthy route.
Since this could lead to the problem that a packet stays at the same level while
making a round-trip, the weight of upper level increases with each hop. This
ensures that packet transfer goes in the direction of the base station.
Figure 7.2: Sensor boards: ESB 430/1 and MSB-430
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AB KM MPR EF total
cluster-head: RAM 434 B 9 B 710 B 41 B 1194 B
cluster-head: EEPROM 800 B 2440 B 252 B 981 B 4473 B
sensor node: RAM 54 B 9 B 0 B 0 B 63 B
sensor node: EEPROM 0 B 92 B 0 B 537 B 629 B
Table 7.1: SecSens memory requirements, (AB) - authenticated broadcasts, (KM)
- key management, (MPR) - multi-path routing, (EF) - en-route
filtering
Furthermore, SecSens provides passive participation, i.e. sensor nodes listen to
packet transmissions of their neighbors. If cluster-head u detects a packet ad-
dressed to its neighbor v, and recognizes that v is not forwarding the message,
u takes responsibility with a certain (low) probability. Also, if u assumes that v
forwards the message to a non-existent node, u takes care of transferring.
7.4.4 En-route Filtering
Attacks like report fabrication or false data injection threaten the network by
manipulating and infiltrating sensor data. SecSens prevents such threats using
en-route filtering extending approach of [YLLZ05]. Cluster-heads generate data
reports containing sensor information of cluster members for sending them to
base stations. These reports are verified during transfer through the inter-cluster
network. En-route filtering consists of three phases: key generation, report gen-
eration, and verification.
Key generation: SecSens provides a global pool containing N en-route keys{
Ke0 , . . . , K
e
N−1
}
. The keys Kei are subdivided in n partitions with each m keys.
Each sensor node generates all en-route keys in the initial phase using one-way
function F and chooses randomly a partition j where it finally draws k < m keys
from set j:
∀i ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1} : Kei = FKeM (i) (7.18)
Only base stations can definitely detect all fault reports, because they possess
all keys of the key pool. Based on the same partition j, each node calculates in
a similar way location key K lC,j for all its clusters that it senses as a member.
Sensor nodes bind themselves locally to actual cluster by the location key. After
the initial phase nodes delete all remaining unused keys.
Report generation: If a cluster-head wants to generate a report, it collects sensor
data from all its cluster members. Sensor nodes belonging to the same cluster
report events (sensor data) collectively by generating MACs based on their en-
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route keys, whereas keys must be chosen from different partitions. These multiple
MACs collectively act as the proof that a report is legitimate. Finally, the cluster-
head forwards the report to the base station over the inter-cluster network.
Verification of reports: A cluster-head receiving a report checks, if it has one
of the keys, that were used to generate the MACs in the report. With a certain
probability, it will be able to verify the correctness of MACs. A report with an
insufficient number of MACs will not be forwarded. A compromised node has
keys from one partition and can generate MACs of one category only. Since
keys and indices of distinct partitions must be present in a legitimate report, the
compromised node has to forge the other key indices and corresponding MACs.
This can be easily detected by cluster-heads possessing these keys. If a cluster-
head has none of the keys and number of MACs is correct, it forwards report to
the next cluster-head. Even if a forged report receives a base station, it can be
detected, because base stations know all the used keys.
7.4.5 Evaluation
SecSens was evaluated on an environment with different kinds of sensor nodes:
ESB 430/1 and MSB-430 of Freie University Berlin. Both sensor boards have the
TI MSP430 microcontroller. ESB 430/1 contains 60 KB flash memory and 2 KB
RAM, whereas MSB-430 has 55 KB flash memory and 5 KB RAM. Because of
the larger RAM, MSB-430 was used as cluster-head. We used four cluster-heads
managing each five sensor nodes that were all ESB boards, making 20 nodes
alltogether. Two PCs act as base stations. We could successfully perform all
stages of SecSens which were described before.
Authenticated broadcast
Key management
Multi-path routing
En-route filtering
Figure 7.3: Memory map of SecSens security components
In order to use memory effectively, SecSens stores frequently changing data in
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packets data energy
sensor node 15 0,2 KB 0,2 Ws
cluster-head 142 4,1 KB 2,6 Ws
Table 7.2: Costs in initial phase
RAM and relatively static data in EEPROM. Table 7.1 describes memory con-
sumption of cluster-heads and sensor nodes. The most memory space is used for
key management which takes 43% of RAM. Figure 7.3 shows the memory map
of SecSens security components.
In the initial phase, energy consumption is comparatively high. For establishing
the network and distribution of keys, cluster-heads consume in average 2.6Ws
energy, whereas sensor nodes need only 0.2Ws (see Table 7.2).
Energy consumption for sending reports depends on the distance between cluster-
head and the base station. We established in a second test a network with up
to 20 cluster-heads placed in a line side by side. The last cluster-head received
level 20, which means that it needs 20 hops to reach the base station. We mea-
sured the energy consumption for sending reports from different levels. The
multi-path routing ensures a robust transmission, but sending duplicated packets
from several routes (fanout) increases the energy consumption. Figure 7.4 shows
consumed energy for reports using no fanout (reference) or multiple fanouts.
As mentioned above, nodes can listen to packet transmission of neighbors and
can take the responsibility for forwarding with a certain probability in case of
detected failures. Figure 7.5 describes the energy results for passive participation
with different probabilities.
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Figure 7.4: Consumed energy for reporting
Figure 7.5: Energy consumption with passive participation
8 Location Estimation and
Tracking in WSN
Recent developments in the area of ubiquitous and pervasive computing empha-
size the interest in context-aware applications. Location is probably the most
important context. Indoor location estimation and tracking remains challenging
due to the lack of usable and cost-effective technologies. GPS has proved itself for
outdoor usage, but it is not suitable for indoor applications due to poor coverage.
To gather real world information from the environment, ubiquitous and pervasive
systems build on sensors attached in everyday objects. Wireless connectivity
of sensors opens a wide range of applications. The main focus of this chapter
is to use wireless sensor network for location estimation and tracking. Since
the cost for sensors is low, the location tracking system is assumed to be cost-
effective. Using wireless connections, it is possible to calculate current location of
a user or an object. For some applications it is even sufficient to estimate user’s
location in a room. Providing more accuracy opens up an opportunity for more
specific services. The Smart Doorplate project [BKS+08] [TBPU03] establishes
a ubiquitous environment with intelligent doorplates, which present information
about the office and employees to the visitors outside. Electronic touch-screen
displays provide location of the office owner and some status information, such
as, person is on the phone, absent, or busy. This chapter describes LocSens
([BUB08b], [BKSU09]) a location tracking system based on wireless sensors, that
is used to get location information for Smart Doorplate services. LocSens works
with fixed room sensors that communicate with mobile sensors carried by users.
Usually each sensor node in a wireless sensor network has its own processor,
memory and application specific sensors. LocSens uses the ESB430 sensor boards
that are developed at the Freie University of Berlin [Sca07].
It is a characteristic of sensor nodes that all resources are extremely limited. The
energy supply is usually provided by a battery. LocSens uses cable operated sen-
sor nodes for fixed positions in rooms as well as battery operated sensor boards
carried by users. For current prototypes only a limited memory capacity is avail-
able. On the average sensor boards have less than 20 kilobytes of RAM and about
100 kilobytes of flash memory. In order to reduce the energy consumption, low
performance processors are used on sensor boards. In most cases it is an 8-bit
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microcontroller. Therefore, the performance and speed is very limited. Wireless
communication has naturally a weak data throughput. Additionally problems
with packet failures, packet loss, and collisions lead to increased time delays.
8.1 LocSens - Indoor Location Tracking Using
Wireless Sensors
LocSens is based on an active environment, where room sensors, attached at
fixed positions, communicate with mobile sensors carried by users. In order to
determine an exact location, it is necessary to perform distance measurements
to multiple points.The test bed in LocSens consist of three rooms of about 80
m2 together, where we placed three sensor boards forming the basic infrastruc-
ture. A fourth board is worn by the user, who moves through the environment.
Consciously, we use a passive infrastructure, i.e. the room nodes act only as
receiver for signals sent by the mobile sensor board. This has the advantage that
chronological assignments of the signals onto actual positions become easier.
With this configuration, we recorded a reference model consisting of more than
30.000 data sets. We defined 70 measurement points for all rooms. At each point
we gathered data for four orientations (north, west, east, south). By recording
several data sets at each point, we aimed to outweigh the jitter of the radio
transceivers. Figure 8.1 shows a ground plan of the test environment, as well as
room sensors and points of measurements.
The transceiver of the sensor board ESB430 provides a value for the receiving
level. This value indicates the distance between the current sensor node and the
packet sender. A precise location tracking requires a nearly constant receiving
level. Therefore, it is necessary to first test the stability of level values. One of
the room sensors is attached to a PC, where measurement values can be read out
from all sensors. As the first stability test, we sent sequentially radio packets to
all room sensor boards and measured the receiving level. These tests ran over
several nights to minimize the signal level deviation caused by interferences, e.g.
through persons in the rooms. Figure 8.2 shows the level values of a sensor board
measured over a full day. The chart shows that values are mostly located in a
thin band, which indicates a good stability. But there exist also some irregular
deviations.
Besides the room sensor nodes, there is also a mobile user sensor board. Further-
more, signal strength of the user board is measured by room sensor nodes. As
shown in Figure 8.1, points of measurement form a raster with a distance of about
one meter between each point. Figure 8.3 shows the user carrying mobile sensor
node and measurement equipment. The aim was to build up a reference model
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Bureau (B)
Gangway (G)
Figure 8.1: Testing environment
that should be used for location estimation performing different algorithms. For
each point the coordinates, user’s line of sight (N, E, S, W), and receiving level
of all three room nodes were stored in a database. In order to have a reliable
basis, 120 data points for each line of sight were gathered, achieving 33600 data
points altogether.
The location estimation algorithm compares current receiving levels with the data
records in the database. In order to optimize the estimation, we implemented
several algorithms. The first approach is the randomized evaluation, which is
actually not practical, but often used as comparison to other approaches. Ran-
domized evaluation chooses randomly k neighboring points r1, ..., rk from the
reference database. The position P is calculated by interpolating between these
points with fixed weights of 1
k
:
P =
k∑
i=1
1
k
ri (8.1)
As further approach for location estimation, we chose nearest neighbor in signal
strength space (NNSS). This algorithm differs from the previous one, because it
considers k points n1, ..., nk from the reference database, which have the lowest
Euclidian distance to the current measured receiving level. Position P can be
calculated in the same way by interpolation with weights of 1
k
.
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t
Figure 8.2: Receiving level of a sensor board considered over time
The disadvantage of both previous algorithms is that fixed weights are used. In
order to optimize the search for appropriate neighboring points, we implemented
a statistical approach (STAT) that uses the density of a multidimensional normal
distribution as an auxiliary function:
f(xˆ) = (
1√
2pi
)n
1√
det(Σ)
e−
1
2
(xˆ−µˆ)TΣ−1(xˆ−µˆ) (8.2)
where:
n ∈ IN
xˆ ∈ IRn
µˆ expectation vector, µi = E(Xi)
Σ variance-covariance matrix, σii = V ar(Xi),
σij = Cov(Xi, Yj) for i 6= j
In the present case with three room nodes, there is a three-dimensional random
variable X(n = 3), which describes the receiving level at the three room sensor
boards. For each reference point p, the values of µˆp and Σp are calculated.
Moreover, the density fp can be determined at each reference point p.
The k reference points s1, ..., sk with the highest density d1, ..., dk are chosen for
the estimation of the current position, in the way that weights w1, ..., wk are
calculated as follows:
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4 Erster Aufbau des Ortungssystems 
In diesem Kapitel soll das in 5 beschriebene Ortungssystem mit dem MSB-430 aufgebaut 
werden. Dazu werden zunächst einige Vorbereitungen beschrieben die für den Aufbau 
nötig waren. Darauf folgt eine Skizzierung des Aufbaus in der Testumgebung. Eine 
Darstellung der Referenzmodellaufzeichnung, die Auswertung der ersten Daten und der 
Vergleich mit den Ergebnissen aus 5 schließen das Kapitel ab. 
4.1 Vorbereitung 
Um das System aus 5 mit den neuen Boards nachbauen zu können, mussten einige 
Vorbereitungen getroffen werden. Diese sollen der Vollständigkeit wegen hier kurz 
beschrieben werden. 
Interaktion mit der Motte 
Zur Aufzeichnung des Referenzmodells war es notwendig, der mobilen Motte an jeder 
beliebigen Position im Raum, manuell eine Sendeaufforderung zukommen zu lassen. Da 
die Motten über keinen programmierbaren Knopf verfügen, musste diese Aufforderung 
über die serielle Schnittstelle geschickt werden. Dazu wurde ein Notebook verwendet, 
welches der Benutzer bei der Aufnahme mit sich herumtragen konnte. Da die Aufnahme 
eines Referenzmodells durchschnittlich 3,5 Stunden dauerte, wurde eine 
Tragevorrichtung entwickelt, welche den Benutzer deutlich entlastete und ihm ein freies 
Agiere  mit den Händen ermöglichte (siehe Abbildung 4.1). In einem Rucksack wurde 
das Netzteil des Notebooks untergebracht und über ein Verlängerungskabel an das 
Stromnetz des Gebäudes angeschlossen. 
 
Abbildung 4.1: Mobile Tragevorrichtung für die 
Aufzeichnung des Referenzmodells 
 
 
 
Abbildung 4.2: Motte auf Holzträger 
 
 
Figure 8.3: Mobile user with measurement equipment and room sensor boards
wi =
di∑k
j=1 dj
∀i = 1..k (8.3)
Finally the position P can be calculated as:
P =
k∑
i=1
wisi (8.4)
8.2 Evaluation
Based on the algorithms described in the previous section, we performed several
tests, where the location was calculated at different points in the rooms. Stand-
ing at a specific position, three neighboring points were chosen for interpolation.
Figure 8.4 visualizes the percentiles for all three algorithms (NNSS, STAT, rand),
i.e. the percentage of points where the difference between calculated and real po-
sition is x meters (e.g. %25 of the calculated positions have a deviation of 0-1.5
m from the real position). The results show that NNSS and STAT achieve con-
siderably better results than the randomized algorithm, whereas NNSS provides
best values.
For the first enhancement, we examined the impact of neighbors by increasing the
number of considered neighboring points. Figure 8.5 describes NNSS performed
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Figure 8.4: Percentile for NNSS, STAT, and random evaluation using 3 neighbors
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Figure 8.5: Percentile for NNSS using 1-7 neighbors
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from 1 to 7 neighbors. Using two neighbors instead of only one provides a clear
improvement. In the 90th percentile the deviation decreases by 1.10 m. This
value is enhanced by 0.36 m when three neighbors are considered. With more
than three neighbors the improvement is not much better. STAT presents similar
results. Therefore, it makes only sense to consider at most four neighbors.
In order to examine the impact of the reference data on the precision of location,
we performed further tests, changing the number of considered reference points.
Decreasing the number of reference points leads to better performance, because
the lookup for neighbors takes less time. The results in Figure 8.6 show that even
with nearly half of the reference points, STAT provides acceptable values, and
NNSS behaves similarly. Also the number of data sets at each reference point
can be decreased without loosing much location precision.
8.2.1 First Optimizations
Nevertheless, it is important to choose the right reference points for the calcu-
lation. If the user stands near a wall, it is not reasonable to choose reference
points from the other side of the wall. In order to ensure this, we optimized the
reference database by storing the current room for each point of measurement.
This was easy to realize using the infrared sender/receiver of the sensor board.
Figure 8.7 shows that both approaches (NNSS and STAT) provide much better
results when additional sensor information is considered.
1m 2m 3m 4m 5m 6m 7m 8m 9m 10m
25%
50%
75%
100%
STAT-Ref. P
____ 70
____ 30
____ 17
Figure 8.6: Percentile for STAT with different numbers of reference points (70,
30, 17)
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Figure 8.7: Percentile for NNSS and STAT with/without IR information
8.2.2 Location Tracking
After examining possible optimizations of location estimation, we performed tests
with LocSens where we tracked a moving user. Location tracking is performed
by continually calculating timely related data sets. Figure 8.8 shows the actual
path of the user through the rooms.
6.3. Einsatz und Evaluierung
Abbildung 6.2: Betrachteter Weg eines Benutzers, an den markierten Punkten befinden
sich die Raummotten, an welchen Location-Ereignisse erzeugt wurden
Abbildung 6.3: Berechneter Weg eines Benutzers mit NNSS
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Figure 8.8: Tracking a moving user with LocSens
We chose the STAT algorithm for location tracking. In order to gain fast cal-
culation of current positions, only four data sets for each reference point are
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6.3. Einsatz und Evaluierung
Abbildung 6.2: Betrachteter Weg eines Benutzers, an den markierten Punkten befinden
sich die Raummotten, an welchen Location-Ereignisse erzeugt wurden
Abbildung 6.3: Berechneter Weg eines Benutzers mit NNSS
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Figure 8.9: Calculated path of user
with STAT
6.3. Einsatz und Evaluierung
Abbildung 6.4: Berechneter Weg eines Benutzers mit NNSS und Aktualisierung der Re-
ferenzdaten
Abbildung 6.5: Berechneter Weg eines Benutzers mit extNNSS
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Figure 8.10: Calculated path of user
after optimization
considered. This ensures a real-time tracking of the user. Figure 8.9 visualizes
the calculated positions of the user moving along the path shown above.
For some points, there are position changes of several meters. Even changes
through walls are calculated incorrectly. For further optimizations, we could
solve these problems. At first, we limited the considered reference points to only
points in a specific distance to the last position.
Using the vibration sensor of the user sensor board, it is possible to detect the
motion intensity. This information can be used to dynamically adapt the dis-
tance variable. If the user walks faster, the range of considered points increases
automatically. Furthermore, position changes through walls can be avoided by
allowing room changes only near to doors.
Figure 8.10 shows the calculated path after above mentioned optimizations. The
tracking precision in the smaller rooms could be clearly enhanced. In the large
room there are still position changes of several meters, but the actual path of the
user can be approximated.
8.3 Optimizations for LocSens
The results showed so far are not convincing if LocSens is applied on real appli-
cations. Therefore, we decided to optimize the system by first using enhanced
sensor hardware and then applying new algorithms for location estimation and
tracking [BKUB09].
In all tests above, LocSens used the ESB430 sensor boards, which are now re-
placed by the more up-to-date model MSB430. The MSB430 board has a modular
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structure, where specific sensor modules can be easily attached. In the basic form,
there exist two modules: a basis module (MSB-430T) and a kernel module (MSB-
430). The kernel module uses a TI MSP430F1612 microcontroller and a Chipcon
CC1020 radio transceiver, both enhancing the performance in comparison to the
older board ESB430. Also three sensors are attached on the kernel module: an
acceleration sensor, a temperatur sensor, and a humidity sensor. Figure 7.2 shows
a picture of the MSB430 basis module.
The main disadvantage of NNSS is that it needs a long time to calculate. There-
fore, we modified the NNSS algorithm to achieve enhancements in time of calcu-
lation and accuracy. The first idea was to use an arithmetic mean of all relevant
reference data points instead of regarding 100 reference data sets in NNSS for each
position and line of sight. We call this modified algorithm M-NNSS. Following
equation clarifies the modification:
RM−NNSS = {
 M(x)M(y)
M(z)
} (8.5)
where M(a) = 1
100
∑100
i=1 ai.
Figure 8.11 visualizes the percentiles for both algorithms (NNSS and M-NNSS),
i.e. the percentage of points where the difference between calculated and real
position is at most x meters (e.g. %25 of the calculated positions have a deviation
of 0-1.5 m from the real position). The algorithms were performed regarding 1-7
neighboring points. The results show that M-NNSS achieves higher accuracy in
upper percentiles, i.e. there are more points with lower deviation.
8.3.1 Cluster optimization
In some cases NNSS chooses neighbors which are too far away from the actual
position. This leads to miscalculations that can be eliminated by filtering out
neighbors with long distances. The cluster optimization approach chooses only
the neighbors which have distances lower than a specific value. Figure 8.12 shows
the results of the cluster approach compared to NNSS and M-NNSS using both
four neighbors. It is clearly seen that cluster approach achieves much better
results than NNSS and M-NNSS. In average the accuracy lies at 1.88m using
cluster optimization.
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4.4.2 Ergebnisse der ersten Auswertung 
Betrachtet wurde das Referenzmodell von drei Raummotten aus VK1 und einer  mobilen 
Motte auf der Brust des Benutzers. Die erste Analyse geschah mittels NNSS(1-7) und M-
NNSS(1-7). 
Punktgenaue Auswertung  
Abbildung 4.5 zeigt die Perzentile der Abweichung für VK1. Tabelle 4.1 und Tabelle 4.2 
fassen die wichtigsten Perzentile zusammen.  
Die NNSS-Suche mit 1-7 Nachbarn erzielt exakte Treffer in knapp 25% der Fälle. Im 75. 
Perzentil wird die Auswirkung der Nachbarn am deutlichsten: NNSS(7) erzielt mit 4,19 
m eine um gut 80 cm bessere Genauigkeit als NNSS(1). Auch bei der durchschnittlichen 
Abweichung liegt NNSS(7) mit 2,58 m klar vor NNSS(1) mit 2,96 m. Die Suche mit M-
NNSS liefert im Vergleich ein interessantes Ergebnis. Die Kurven der Perzentile mit M-
NNSS(2-7) steigen nach einem verhaltenen Start deutlich stärker an, als die der Perzentile 
mit NNSS(1-7). Sie erzielen so im Bereich des 50. – 90. Perzentil Verbesserungen von bis 
zu 2 m. M-NNSS(1) liegt mit einer, fast durchgängig, um 20 cm kleineren Abweichung, 
vor NNSS(7). Lediglich im 100. Perzentil übersteigt sie den Wert um 14 cm. Im 
Durchschnitt liegt bei dieser Auswertung M-NNSS(1) mit 2,34 m vorne. Es ist zu 
beobachten, dass sich die durchschnittlichen Abweichungen, mit steigender Anzahl von 
Nachbarn bei NNSS und M-NNSS gegenläufig verhalten. Mehr Nachbarn führen bei 
NNSS zu besseren Durchschnitten während es sich bei M-NNSS gerade umgekehrt 
verhält. Dafür sinkt die maximale Abweichung (100. Perzentil) bei M-NNSS(7) auf 7,39 
m und ist damit in diesem Bereich um 3,01 m besser als M-NNSS(1). 
 
Abbildung 4.5: Perzentile der Abweichung; VK1, NNSS(1-7) und M-NNSS(1-7) 
Figure 8.11: Percentile for M-NNSS and NNSS using MSB430 sensor boards
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von 1,88 m. Tabelle 5.4 fasst diese Ergebnisse mit ausgewählten Perzentilen der 
Abweichung zusammen. 
 
Abbildung 5.8: Perzentile der Abweichung; VK1; NNSS(4) und M-NNSS(4); Cluster(0) 
Tabelle 5.4: Ausgewählte Perzentile der Abweichung; VK1; NNSS(4), M-NNSS(4) und Cluster(0) 
 25% 50% 75% 90% 100% Ø 
NNSS(4) 0,31 2,24 4,50 6,08 10,26 2,71 
M-NNSS(4) 1,46 2,30 3,40 4,26 8,04 2,49 
Cluster(0) 0,00 0,87 3,50 5,25 10,26 1,88 
Raumtreffer 
Auch hinsichtlich der Raumtreffer sind mit Cluster Verbesserungen zu erkennen. Tabelle 
5.5 zeigt die Raumtrefferwahrscheinlichkeiten für alle drei betrachteten Methoden. Mit 
Cluster wurden hier erstmals für alle Räume durchgängige 
Raumtrefferwahrscheinlichkeiten von über 50 % erreicht. Für das Hiwi-Büro (B), liegt 
der mit Cluster(0) erzielte Wert, 5 Prozentpunkte hinter dem vergleichbaren Ergebnis 
von M-NNSS. Dafür werden in den beiden anderen Räumen deutlich bessere Ergebnisse 
erreicht, wodurch Cluster(0) in der Summe mit einem Abstand von 14 Prozentpunkten 
vorne liegt. 
Tabelle 5.5: Raumtrefferwahrscheinlichkeiten; VK1; NNSS(4), M-NNSS(4) und Cluster(0) 
 B L G P(Raumtreffer) 
NNSS(4): P(calc|real) 0,87 0,22 0,64 0,65 
M-NNSS(4): P(calc|real) 0,89 0,54 0,36 0,64 
Cluster(0): P(calc|real) 0,84 0,72 0,76 0,79 
 
Figure 8.12: Percentile for M-NNSS, NNSS, and Cluster approach
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8.3.2 Optimization of Room Sensor Positions
The position of room sensor nodes can also influence the location estimation. In
order to examine different positions for the three room sensor nodes we estab-
lished several placement constellations. Figure 8.13 shows four test configura-
tions, where red crosses indicate room sensor nodes.
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5.2.4 Bewertung von Cluster 
Die hier mit Cluster erzielten Ergebnisse sind in Summe deutlich besser als die 
Ergebnisse von NNSS und M-NNSS.  
5.3 Optimierung der Raummotten-Position 
Um einen möglichen Zusammenhang zwischen den Positionen der Raummotten und 
den Ergebnissen der Ortsbestimmung zu überprüfen, wurden im nächsten 
Optimierungsschritt verschiedene Aufstellungen von 3 Raummotten ausgewertet. 
5.3.1 Beschreibung der Aufstellungsvarianten 
Es wurden vier Aufst llungsvarianten u tersucht die im weiteren Verlauf mit VK2a–2d 
bezeichnet werden. Abbildung 5.9 zeigt die P sitionierungen der Raummotten für jede 
der Varianten. Die Raummotten sind in der Abbildung mit roten Kreuzen markiert. 
 
Abbildung 5.9: Übersicht über die Versuchskonfigurationen VK2a-2d 
5.3.2 Vergleich der Aufstellungsvarianten 
Um die Positionierungen der Raummotten hinsichtlich der Zweckmäßigkeit für die 
Ortsbestimmung zu vergleichen, wurde ein neues Referenzmodell aufgezeichnet. Dabei 
wurden 4 Raummotten in den Ecken der Testumgebung aufgestellt (vgl. Abbildung 
5.14). Für die Auswertungen der Aufstellungen 2a-2d, wurden die Werte der jeweils 
überflüssigen Raummotte aus den aufgezeichneten Daten herausgefiltert.  
Ergebnisse von NNSS 
Abbildung 5.10 zeigt die Perzentile der Abweichung für alle Konfigurationen VK2a-2d, 
bei der Suche mit NNSS(4). Tabelle 5.6 und Tabelle 5.7 stellen ausgewählte Perzentile zu 
allen 4 Auswertungen heraus und geben einen Überblick über die jeweils erzielten 
Raumtrefferwahrscheinlichkeiten. Alle vier Kurven der Perzentile verlaufen weitgehend 
parallel und mit einem geringen Abstand zueinander. Insgesamt wird sichtbar, dass die 
Kurve für VK2d weitgehend vor allen anderen Kurven liegt, und eine durchschnittliche 
Abweichung von 2,60 m aufweist. Damit liegt sie 15 cm vor VK2b und 30 cm vor VK2a. 
Die größte, gemittelte Abweichung entsteht bei VK2c mit 2,94 m. Die höchste 
Wahrscheinlichkeit für Raumtreffer weist VK2a mit 67% auf. Kurz darauf folgt VK2d 
mit 65%. 
Figure 8.13: Different placements of room sensor nodes
For each constellation we performed the NNSS location estimation algorithm.
The results are shown in Figure 8.14. The values for all four constellations are
almost parallel, whereas constellati n 2d achi ves the best results. We also per-
formed M-NNSS and cluster algorithms for all placements, but the differences
between the constellations were unmentionable low.
The next logical step would be to use four room senso node instead of only
three. This implies an increase of processing time due to dditional calculations.
But as you can see in Figure 8.15 all three algorithms achieve better results.
The cluster approach gain 0.68m lower accuracy in average to 1.20m, which is
obviously worth the additional calculations.
In all above test scenarios the user was carrying the mobile sensor node at his
chest. Since the body blocks radio signals, the received signal level in some
positions would be corrupted. In order to examine this fact we placed the mobile
sensor node on top of user’s head. Figure 8.16 shows a picture of the user. In this
optimal scenario we could achieve the best results for all algorithms. Table 8.1
describes some chosen p rce tiles for NNSS, M-NNSS, and cluster algorithms.
Unfortunately, carrying the sensor node on top of the head is inconvenient for a
person. Therefore this is not a realistic scenario. Nevertheless, this evaluation
clarified the impact of interferences in wireless communication.
Table 8.2 gives an overview of several location estimation techniques compared
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Abbildung 5.10: Perzentile der Abweichung für VK2a-2d; NNSS(4) 
Tabelle 5.6: Ausgewählte Perzentile der Abweichung für VK2a-2d; NNSS(4) 
NNSS(4) 
 25% 50% 75% 90% 100% Ø 
VK2a 0,75 2,55 4,61 6,52 10,41 2,90 
VK2b 0,62 2,36 4,42 6,05 10,41 2,75 
VK2c 0,98 2,51 4,72 6,50 9,86 2,94 
VK2d 0,50 2,15 4,25 6,00 9,78 2,60 
Tabelle 5.7: Raumtrefferwahrscheinlichkeiten für VK2a-2d; NNSS(4) 
NNSS(4) 
 B L G P(Raumtreffer) 
VK2a, P(calc|real) 0,90 0,20 0,66 0,67 
VK2b, P(calc|real) 0,79 0,24 0,56 0,59 
VK2c, P(calc|real) 0,64 0,42 0,69 0,61 
VK2d, P(calc|real) 0,73 0,46 0,68 0,65 
Ergebnisse von M-NNSS und Cluster 
Die Ergebnisse von M-NNSS und Cluster für die Konfigurationen VK2a-2d sind nicht 
so differenziert wie die von NNSS. Sie sollen hier dennoch kurz dargestellt werden. 
Tabelle 5.8 listet einige Perzentile der Abweichung zu M-NNSS(4) und Cluster(0) für alle 
Konfigurationsvarianten VK2a-2d auf. Tabelle 5.9 stellt die zugehörigen 
Wahrscheinlichkeiten für die Raumtreffer zusammen. Die erzielten, durchschnittlichen 
Abweichungen variieren zwischen den einzelnen Konfigurationen bei M-NNSS nur um 
maximal 9 cm, bei Cluster nur bis zu 5 cm. Auch hinsichtlich der 
Raumtrefferwahrscheinlichkeiten sind keine großen Schwankungen zwischen den 
Konfigurationen zu verzeichnen. Bei M-NNSS liegt der maximale Unterschied bei 4 
Prozentpunkten. Bei Cluster beträgt diese Differenz 5 Prozentpunkte. Tendenziell 
schneidet auch hier VK2d am besten ab.  
Figure 8.14: Percentile for NNSS in different room node placements
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Veränderungen gegenüber dem Abstimmungsverfahren (VK3a). Dabei wird deutlich, 
dass die Verwendung aller 4 Raummotten die durchschnittliche Abweichung konsequent 
verringerte. Die einzige Verschlechterung tritt mit Cluster(0) im 100. Perzentil der 
Abweichung auf. Hier erzi lte das Abstimmungsverfahren eine um 77 cm bessere, 
maximale Abweichung. 
 
Abbildung 5.15: Perzentile der Abweichung; VK3b; N (4), M-NNSS(4) und Cluster(0) 
Figure 8.15: Percentile for NNSS, M-NNSS, and cluster using four room sensor
nodes
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5.4.3 Bewertung der Verbesserung 
Das Abstimmungsverfahren mit vier Kombinationen aus drei Raummotten (VK3a), 
ermöglicht eine bessere Ortsbestimmung als die isolierte Verwendung von drei 
Raummotten (vgl. VK2a-2d). Allerdings müssen für jeden Testdatensatz vier vollständige 
Berechnungen durchgeführt werden, was den Zeitaufwand entsprechend erhöht. Die 
Verwendung aller 4 Raummotten in einer Berechnung (VK3b), ermöglicht dagegen eine 
deutlich verbesserte Ortsbestimmung mit geringem Mehraufwand. Durch die 
Reduzierung der durchschnittlichen Abweichung um knapp 50% und die Erhöhung der 
Raumtrefferwahrscheinlichkeit von 65% auf 83% (NNSS(4) bezogen auf VK1), erhält 
diese Verbesserung einen hohen Stellenwert im Rahmen der Optimierung. 
5.5 Verbesserung durch Reduktion der Signalabschirmung 
Die im vorangehenden Abschnitt beschriebene Verwendung von vier statt drei 
Raummotten, verbesserte die Ortsbestimmung signifikant. Im nächsten Teilschritt der 
Optimierung wurde versucht, jegliche Resteinflüsse der Signalabschirmung durch den 
Körper des Benutzers, auszublenden. 
5.5.1 Technische Umsetzung 
Die einzige Stelle des menschlichen Körpers, die horizontal gesehen, auf volle 360 Grad 
nicht durch irgendeinen Teil des Körpers abgeschirmt wird, befindet sich offensichtlich 
auf dem Kopf. Die Anbringung der mobilen Motte für Versuchskonfiguration VK4, 
erfolgte deswegen auf dem Kopf des Benutzers. Abbildung 5.16 zeigt den Benutzer bei 
der Aufnahme des Referenzmodells. Die mobile Motte wurde aufrecht stehend, auf einer 
Schirmmütze montiert und über ein Kabel mit der Stromversorgung im Rucksack 
verbunden. Für die Interaktion mit der mobilen Motte diente dem Benutzer wieder ein 
Notebook, das mit der seriellen Schnittstelle der Motte verbunden war. 
 
Abbildung 5.16: Aufnahme des Referenzmodells für VK4; Mobile Motte befindet sich auf dem Kopf des 
Benutzers Figure 8.16: Mobile sensor node on top of user’s head
Table 8.1: Chosen percentiles for NNSS, M-NNSS, and cluster where mobile node
is on user’s head
25% 50% 75% 100% average
NNSS 0.00 0.50 1.91 9.55 1.18
M-NNSS 1.12 1.68 2.26 5.34 1.82
Cluster 0.00 0.00 1.80 10.26 1.05
with LocSens. As seen in this table LocSens achieves very good accuracy values
with very low installation costs.
8.3.3 Optimization of Location Tracking
Since four room sensor nodes achieved best results in location estimation, we also
used four room nodes for tracking. The user carries again a mobile sensor node
on his chest. Room nodes request periodically location messages from the mobile
node. Using signal strength level each node estimates the actual location of the
user based on NNSS algorithm. Figure 8.8 shows the actual path of the user
through three rooms.
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Table 8.2: Comparison of location estimation techniques
System Technology Range Accuracy Size of test
(indoors) environment
Active Badge Infrared < 6m exact room unknown
RADAR WLAN 25m - 50m 2.75m 44m x 23m
LANDMARC active RFID 50m 1m 9m x 4m
LocSens (ESB430) RF < 20m 2.90m 10m x 8m
LocSens (MSB430) RF < 20m 1.05m 10m x 8m
The first optimization was to use sliding windows, i.e. we collected a specific
number of signal measurements and calculated user’s location over the means of
collected data sets. Figure 8.17 shows enhancements of location tracking using
sliding windows. W (x) indicates calculation based on x collected data sets. In-
creasing the number of data sets achieves better results, but the calculation needs
more time. With this first optimization you can nearly see the path of the user,
but still there are some miscalculated positions. In order to eliminate them we
performed further optimization steps.
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aufeinander folgende Messdatensätze in eine Mittelwertberechnung einflossen. Als 
abkürzende Schreibweise soll hier W(x) für ein Zeitfenster über x Messdatensätze 
verwendet werden. Abbildung 6.4 zeigt die NNSS(7)-Ergebnisse der 
Bewegungsverfolgung mit verschiedenen Zeitfenstergrößen. Der Benutzer beschritt beim 
Versuch den in Abbildung 6.2 dargestellten Weg. Es ist deutlich zu sehen, wie sich der 
Bewegungsverlauf mit zunehmender Fenstergröße beruhigt. Mit W(100) kann der 
tatsächliche Verlauf des Weges schon etwas besser nachvollzogen werden als mit W(10). 
Trotzdem machen viele, weit ausfallende Spitzen, den Weg noch sehr unregelmäßig. 
Noch größere Zeitfenster brachten hier keine eindeutigen Verbesserungen mit sich. 
Abbildung 6.5 und Abbildung 6.6 zeigen die entsprechenden Ergebnisse für M-NNSS(7) 
und Cluster(0). Der mit M-NNSS berechnete Weg weist insgesamt weniger extreme 
Spitzen auf als das Ergebnis mit NNSS. Auch hier sorgen größere Zeitfenster für eine 
zunehmende Beruhigung des Verlaufs. Der im unteren Bereich (Gang) beschritt ne Weg 
wurde nicht so gut erkannt wie mit NNSS. Cluster 0) zeigt h er die schl chteste  
Ergebnisse. Eine zunehmende Fenstergröße verringert zwar das Chaos i  den Weglinien, 
eine Nachvollziehbarkeit des Weges ist hier aber auch mit W(100) nicht gegeben.  
 
Abbildung 6.4: Einflüsse der Zeitfenstergröße für die Bewegungsverfolgung; NNSS(7) mit W(10), W(40), 
W(50) und W(100) (von links nach rechts) 
 
Abbildung 6.5: Einflüsse der Zeitfenstergröße für die Bewegungsverfolgung; M-NNSS(7) mit W(10), 
W(40), W(50) und W(100) (von links nach rechts) 
 
Abbildung 6.6: Einflüsse der Zeitfenstergröße für die Bewegungsverfolgung; Cluster (0) mit W(10), W(40), 
W(50) und W(100) (von links nach rechts) 
6.2.2 Cluster mit anderen Grenzwerten 
Bei der Suchmethode Cluster bestimmt der Grenzwert, bis zu welcher Abweichung, 
Referenzdatensätze noch in die Berechnung mit einfließen können. Bei der statischen 
Ortsbestimmung erzielte Cluster immer mit den Grenzwerten 0 und 1 die besten 
Ergebnisse. In Abbildung 6.6 wird jedoch deutlich, das Cluster mit dem Grenzwert 0 bei 
der Bewegungsverfolgung sehr schlechte Ergebnisse erzielte. Dies lässt darauf schließen, 
dass die an den einzelnen Positionen aufgenommenen Messdatensätze sehr stark von den 
Figure 8.17: Location tracking using sliding windows: W (50) and W (100)
Using the acceleration sensor of the user sensor board, it is possible to detect the
motion intensity. This information can be used to dynamically adapt the size
of the sliding window. If the user walks faster, the range of considered points
increases automatically.
As you can see in Figure 8.17 there are several calculated location changes going
through walls. This unlikely situations can be avoided by allowing room changes
only near to doors. For this reason we adapted our algorithm to consider data
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sets from other rooms only if the preceding location was in vicinity of a door.
Figure 8.18 illustrates the results after above mentioned optimizations. Still there
are some miscalculated locations, but you can easily recognize the path of user
across the rooms.
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Abbildung 6.8: Bewegungsverfolgung ohne 
Kompass; M-NNSS(7); W(100) 
 
Abbildung 6.9: Bewegungsverfolgung mit 
Kompass; M-NNSS(7); W(100) 
6.2.4 Platzierung der mobilen Motte auf dem Kopf des Benutzers 
Wie in Kapitel 5 wurde auch für die Optimierung der Bewegungsverfolgung ein Versuch 
gestartet, bei dem der Benutzer die mobile Motte auf dem Kopf trug um 
Signalabschirmungen durch den Körper zu vermeiden. Abbildung 6.10 zeigt das 
Ergebnis einer Berechnung ohne die im letzten Abschnitt eingeführte Kompassfunktion. 
Im Vergleich zur Abbildung 6.8 liegt die Bahn etwas näher am tatsächlichen Wegverlauf. 
Weitere Verbesserungen sind mit der Anbringung der Motte auf dem kopf offenbar aber 
nicht möglich. Abbildung 6.11 veranschaulicht hier die Wirkung der Kompassfunktion 
auf die Berechnung. Im Vergleich zum letzten Versuch sind hier die Einflüsse des 
Kompasses etwas geringer. Dies hängt vermutlich mit der veränderten Anbringung der 
Motte zusammen, wodurch die Blickrichtungsproblematik berei s weitg hend e tsc ärf  
wurde.   
 
Abbildung 6.10: Bewegungsverfolgung eines 
Benutzers, der die mobile Motte 
auf dem Kopf trug; M-NNSS(7); 
W(70); Kompassfunktion 
deaktiviert 
 
Abbildung 6.11: Berechneter Weg eines Benutzers, 
der die mobile Motte auf dem 
Kopf trug; M-NNSS(7); W(70); 
Kompassfunktion aktiv 
 
 
Figure 8.18: Calculated path of user with several optimizations
9 Conclusion
This last chapter summarizes the main achievements of this thesis and provides
an outlook to further research that may lead to the ultimate goal of tiny and
very low cost energy-efficient wireless sensor nodes that can be used for security
related applications.
We described a new system architecture for WSNs that allows applications to
access parameters on different levels to control energy-saving and security. These
features are included in a middleware providing interfaces on application level.
This abstraction opens the possibility to integrate different sensor hardware into
the WSN in an easy way. The middleware offers functionalities to realize commu-
nication, to adjust network topology, to update and reprogram applications, to
localize and track sensor nodes, and to secure data and communication. All these
functionalities are performed in an energy-efficient way to overcome performance
needs for protocol overheads and encryption.
In terms of local communication, this thesis presented the Energy-saving Token
Ring Protocol ESTR for wireless sensor networks. ESTR uses sleep phases to
decrease the energy consumption. Only the node that holds the token can receive
messages from other nodes. This reduces idle-listening and overhearing. ESTR
provides to adjust the maximal permitted ring size, offering a flexible method
to control throughput and energy consumption. Furthermore, the token includes
energy information of preceding nodes that allows self-optimization of the ring
by dynamically adapting the sleep time of each node. In detailed simulations,
ESTR was compared to related MAC protocols. ESTR achieved the best energy
results. The probability of collisions in ESTR is less than in other protocols and
ESTR offers a dynamic energy optimization in the overall network, increasing
network life-time. In further evaluations we measured communication latency.
Although the advantage of ESTR lies in energy-efficiency, it achieves reasonable
latency results. We also proved the usability of ESTR in scenarios with real
sensor boards.
Cluster architectures offer a good basis for scalable and energy-efficient protocols.
Using hierarchy of cluster-heads and sensor nodes, it is possible to limit the range
of each node and to exploit multi-hop communication. This thesis presented
the Variable Ranges protocol for WSN that allows applications to adjust the
topology. By dynamically adapting the range of each node, the network can be
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established with low complexity, but still with high connectivity. Since nodes do
not sent messages with full transmission power, the energy consumption decreases
considerably. Evaluations showed that VR protocol achieved an extended lifetime
of the overall sensor network without decreasing the connectivity.
In the field of code mobility this thesis presented the Ubiquitous Mobile Agent
System for wireless sensor networks - UbiMASS. UbiMASS is very light-weighted
so that it can run on tiny devices like sensor boards. It is designed using a modular
architecture in order to ease adaption for other hardware and to offer a convenient
way for programming new services in the form of agents. Using the wireless link
agents can migrate to remote nodes. The UbiMASS communication layer is
responsible for the reliable transfer of agents. In order to load and bind agent
code dynamically, UbiMASS provides the ELF loader that is based on a standard
approach. The agent can access sensor and actuator information using interfaces
of the underlying middleware. The migration engine offers agents the possibility
to autonomously decide if they want to move to other nodes. We proved the
usability of UbiMASS in scenarios with real sensor boards. Compared to other
systems the reprogramming of nodes can be done in a more flexible and dynamic
way using UbiMASS.
The main focus of this thesis lies on security. We presented here SecSens, a multi-
level security architecture for wireless sensor networks. SecSens combines several
security approaches on different system levels in order to provide high protection.
SecSens contains four components, which interact with each other: authenticated
broadcasts, key management, routing, and en-route filtering. We implemented a
simulation tool, where huge network sizes can be established. Evaluation results
show that SecSens can resist DoS and insider attacks limiting failures to a local
area. Infiltrated false sensor data can be refused with a high probability. We
also demonstrated the feasibility of SecSens by building a real sensor network
environment with two different kinds of sensor boards.
As last feature of the proposed system architecture we presented LocSens, an
indoor location estimation and tracking system based on wireless sensors. Since
sensor boards are produced with low costs, the usage of wireless sensors minimizes
installation cost of the overall system. LocSens was implemented with different
location estimation algorithms, namely NNSS, M-NNSS, and cluster approach.
We evaluated the impact of several modifications on the test environment and
reference data, which resulted in enhancements of system performance. Also the
usage of additional sensor information increased precision of calculation. Espe-
cially, location tracking can benefit from data about movement intensity of the
user. Compared to other indoor location systems LocSens achieves acceptable
results in location estimation and real-time location tracking with considerably
low installation costs.
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In summary, this thesis provides a novel energy-efficient and secure system archi-
tecture for wireless sensor networks. However, there still exist open problems or
application scenario specific problems. It is very complicated to detect attacks
especially if it is an insider attack. Possible intrusion detection mechanisms could
be used also in wireless sensor network in future. Another promising area for fur-
ther research is the use of tamper-resistant hardware in WSNs. Although tamper-
resistant hardware cannot be used in the majority of application scenarios, it is
indispensable for most high-security scenarios to prevent insider attacks. Since
these scenarios may also have different requirements, new application-specific
protocols are needed. As a promising technology to close the energy gap are
energy scavenging techniques. These approaches could be used to extent wireless
sensor network by automatically reloading batteries or to run nodes completely
without batteries. There are still many open issues and problems to be solved in
the construction of energy scavenging systems. More sophisticated micro electro-
mechanical systems (MEMS) will allow to extract more energy at a limited size
of the sensor but a single energy source such as coming from light, vibration,
temperature gradients etc. will always be problematic because it is not reliably
available in most of the applications. Combining different types of energy scav-
enging systems will make the energy source more reliable, but causes an increase
of complexity and cost.
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